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Preface 
 
 
 The Europe 2020 strategy includes CAP reforms proposed by the European 
Commission that are expected to be implemented in 2014. The CAP has often 
been criticised for its harmful impact on specific agricultural and food sectors of 
developing countries. The EU has made important steps towards mitigating this 
impact. Several studies have assessed the impact of the CAP reforms on devel-
oping countries and have generally concluded that the impact of CAP reforms 
depends on the specific products and countries involved. In addition, the EU will 
change its trade policy by adopting a new GSP System. EU agricultural trade 
policies are an intrinsic component of the agricultural policy framework and may 
have an even greater impact on developing countries than the CAP. 
 We find it is difficult to make sweeping statements about the impact of a re-
formed CAP and trade policies on developing countries. This study tries to pin-
point where negative effects can be expected by highlighting four important 
agricultural (export) products: dairy, sugar, fruits and vegetables. We analyse 
the effects of CAP and agricultural trade reform on different developing coun-
tries, by specifying the categories they belong to - such as ACP, Least Devel-
oped Country (LDC) - and by examining the importance of their agricultural trade 
to and from the EU.  
 We find that the impact of CAP reforms on developing countries will be lim-
ited. However, changes in EU trade policies have a much larger effect. The 
changes in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and related Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), for instance, will have more impact than CAP 
reforms on trade relations of developing countries with the EU, which in turn will 
affect agricultural producers and food consumers in these countries. 
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Summary 
 
 
S.1 Key results 
 
In the years 2014-2020, the general impact of the proposed reforms in the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on developing countries is limited, especially 
with high food prices and a low level of trade-distorting support to EU agricul-
ture (Figure S.1).  
 Proposed reforms in EU agricultural trade policies, such as the new GSP 
that determines market access, have more impact on the composition of trade 
with developing countries than the CAP.  
 Any change in CAP and EU trade policies will affect domestic consumers and 
producers in low-income countries differently, both having opposing interests. 
Some harm to either can therefore never be avoided. 
 
Figure S.1 Total value of agriculture and support to agriculture in the EU 
(1986-2009) 
 
Source: OECD-FAO agricultural outlook 2012. 
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S.2 Complementary findings 
 
In the context of global developments, China is becoming an increasingly im-
portant trade partner to developing countries, especially during the past five 
years. However, the EU is still by far a more important trade partner than China, 
except for vegetables. 
 
Table S.1 Impact of CAP and trade reform on dairy, sugar, fruit and 
vegetables sectors in developing countries 
Sector Countries exporting to EU  Countries importing from EU  
Dairy 
 
Negligible 
 
Dairy imports from the EU are relative-
ly unimportant; however, the EU re-
mains the most important source of 
dairy imports for many countries.  
Sugar 
 
Sugar exports to the EU are important 
for a number of ACP countries. For 
these countries, the EU is also the 
main export destination for sugar. 
Negligible 
Fruits 
 
For several Latin American countries 
fruit and banana exports to the EU are 
important; their producers will be vul-
nerable to changes in EU trade rela-
tions.  
Negligible 
Vegetables 
 
Vegetable exports to the EU are rela-
tively unimportant; however, in a 
number of African countries, Europe 
is often their main export market.  
Negligible 
 
 
S.3 Methodology 
 
This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Affairs1 for the Eco-
nomic Risk Management research project.2 In 2014 the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and the system of the General System of preferences (GSP) will be 
subject to major reform. The Ministry has asked LEI Wageningen UR to assess 
                                                 
1 Formerly Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation or EL&I. 
2 Part of the BOCI programme for Policy Research Support. 
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the possible impacts of a reformed CAP and trade policies on developing coun-
tries, in terms of food prices, trade and domestic markets.  
 Developing countries are rather heterogeneous in the way they are affected 
by changes in the CAP and agricultural trade policies. Our approach allows us to 
make a simplified analysis. We have chosen four specific commodity groups: 
dairy, fruits, vegetables and sugar. Further, we have limited our analysis to the 
determination of the vulnerability of different categories of developing countries 
for change. We have done this by analysing the value of imports from and ex-
ports to the EU as a share of total agricultural value or total value of imports or 
exports.  
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Samenvatting 
Hervorming GLB en EU-handelsbeleid 
Beoordeling van het effect op ontwikkelingslanden 
 
 
S.1 Belangrijkste uitkomsten 
 
In de jaren 2014-2020 zal het algehele effect van de voorgestelde hervormin-
gen van het Gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid (GLB) op ontwikkelingslanden 
gering zijn, met name bij hoge voedselprijzen en een lage mate van handelsver-
storende steun aan de EU-landbouw (figuur S.1).  
 De voorgestelde hervormingen van het EU-beleid inzake de handel in land-
bouwproducten, zoals het nieuwe SAP, hebben waarschijnlijk meer effect op de 
samenstelling van de handel met ontwikkelingslanden.  
 Alle wijzigingen in het GLB en EU-handelsbeleid werken in landen met lage 
inkomsten op verschillende wijze door op de binnenlandse consumenten en 
producenten, die elk tegengestelde belangen hebben. Het is daarom onvermij-
delijk dat alle partijen enige schade oplopen. 
 
Figuur S.1 Totale waarde van de landbouw en steun aan landbouw in de 
EU (1986-2009) 
 
Bron: Landbouwvooruitzichten OESO-FAO 2012.  
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S.2 Overige uitkomsten 
 
China wordt in de context van de mondiale ontwikkelingen een steeds belangrij-
ker handelspartner voor ontwikkelingslanden. Dat was met name de afgelopen 
vijf jaar het geval. Vooralsnog is de EU echter een veel belangrijker handelspart-
ner dan China, behalve voor groente. 
 
Tabel S.2 Effect van de hervorming van het GLB en het handelsbeleid 
op de zuivel-, suiker-, fruit- en groentesectoren in ontwikke-
lingslanden 
Sector Landen die exporteren naar de EU Landen die importeren vanuit de EU 
Zuivel 
 
Verwaarloosbaar 
 
De import van zuivel vanuit de EU is rela-
tief onbelangrijk. De EU blijft echter voor 
veel landen de belangrijkste bron van 
zuivelimport.  
Suiker 
 
Voor een aantal ACS-landen is de sui-
kerexport naar de EU belangrijk. Voor 
deze landen is de EU meteen ook de 
belangrijkste exportbestemming voor 
suiker. 
Verwaarloosbaar 
Fruit 
 
Voor een aantal Zuid-Amerikaanse 
landen is de export van fruit en bana-
nen naar de EU belangrijk. De produ-
centen in deze landen zijn kwetsbaar 
voor wijzigingen in de handelsbetrek-
kingen met de EU.  
Verwaarloosbaar 
Groente 
 
De export van groente naar de EU is 
relatief onbelangrijk. Voor een aantal 
Afrikaanse landen is Europa echter de 
belangrijkste exportmarkt.  
Verwaarloosbaar 
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S.3 Methode 
 
Deze rapportage is opgesteld in opdracht van het ministerie van Economische 
Zaken1 ten behoeve van het onderzoeksproject Economisch risicomanage-
ment.2 In 2014 worden het Gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid (GLB) en het 
Systeem van algemene preferenties (SAP) onderworpen aan een ingrijpende 
hervorming. Het ministerie heeft LEI Wageningen UR gevraagd om het mogelijke 
effect van een hervormd GLB en handelsbeleid op ontwikkelingslanden in de zin 
van voedselprijzen, handel en binnenlandse markten te beoordelen.  
 Ontwikkelingslanden zijn vrij heterogeen in de wijze waarop zij worden ge-
troffen door de wijzigingen in het GLB en het beleid inzake de handel in land-
bouwproducten. Op basis van onze benadering kunnen wij een vereenvoudigde 
analyse maken. Wij hebben vier specifieke groepen van grondstoffen geselec-
teerd: zuivel, fruit, groente en suiker. Verder hebben wij ons onderzoek beperkt 
tot het vaststellen van de kwetsbaarheid van de verschillende categorieën ont-
wikkelingslanden voor beleidswijzigingen. Dit hebben wij gedaan door de waarde 
van de import vanuit en de export naar de EU te berekenen als onderdeel van 
de totale landbouwwaarde of de totale import- of exportwaarde.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Voorheen het ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie (EL&I). 
2 Onderdeel van het BOCI-programma voor onderzoeksondersteuning van beleid. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union has long been ac-
cused of having a distortive effect on the world markets for specific commodi-
ties and on the markets of developing countries in particular. Several studies 
have shown that specific CAP and agricultural trade instruments that have the 
intention to protect the internal EU market have had two effects: (i) they either 
limited the export opportunities of developing countries (market access) or had 
(ii) a depressing effect on world market prices (through export restitutions and 
domestic support) (Revoredo-Giha et al., 2011; Stevens, 2008; Donnellan and 
Westhoff, 2001). 
 Nowadays, due to a series of CAP reforms since 1992, the negative effects 
of the CAP on developing countries have been minimised (Cantore, Kennan, and 
Page, 2011). Domestic support has been shifted from price and market support 
coupled to production towards decoupled direct income support to farmers, 
which is viewed as less trade-distorting. In total, support to the agricultural sec-
tor in the EU is now comparable to levels in the US or OECD countries and less 
than 1% of GDP (Figure 1.1). Since the EU is a large agricultural producer and 
exporter, CAP instruments still have an (indirect) impact on world food prices 
and therefore on developing countries, although a possible price depressing ef-
fect of these instruments is blurred in the current situation of high food prices 
(Keijzer and King, 2012).  
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Figure 1.1 Total Support Estimate to agriculture as a % of total GDP 
(1986-2009) 
 
Source: (OECD, 2012). 
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vestments in research are considered a prerequisite for functional and legiti-
mate monitoring of countries' performance on PCD (King et al., 2012).  
 The Dutch government is strongly committed to the principle of PCD and has 
stressed the importance of a sound impact assessment of the CAP on develop-
ing countries (BuZa & EL&I, 2011a). The Dutch government also stressed the 
importance of market access for developing countries and a development-
friendly CAP as part of its national policy on food security (BuZa & EL&I, 2011b). 
 The CAP cannot be separated from EU's agricultural trade policies, especial-
ly because the CAP touches on WTO regulations (Matthews, 2011c; Klavert, 
Engel, and Koeb, 2011; Goodison, 2010). EU agricultural trade policies have an 
important impact on developing countries' agricultural imports and exports. Cur-
rently, many developing countries enjoy preferential access to the EU thanks to 
the Everything But Arms Agreement (for Least Developed Countries or LDCs), 
Economic Partnership Agreements or the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP, for all developing countries) (Bineau and Montalbano, 2011).  
 Although the CAP reform was not intended to address the trade barriers that 
were used to keep some EU market prices higher than world market levels, the 
EU has reduced the impact of these barriers for a number of developing coun-
tries through extending the scope of preferential access under various trade 
agreements (Matthews, 2011a). In addition, export subsidies have largely been 
abolished and import tariffs for developing countries have also largely been 
abolished through the Everything But Arms (EBA) Agreement with the group of 
Least Developed Countries and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (Grant, 2010). 
See Appendix 1 for the list of ACP countries and information on participation in 
EPAs. 
 An important change is the new GSP, which will reduce the number of coun-
tries eligible for trade preferences from 2014 onwards. The Economic Partner-
ship Agreements will become more important as it is intended to fill the gap of 
the new GSP. 
 Whether these changes will lead to an increase of exports to the EU straight 
away remains to be seen. Increasing exports of developing countries to the EU 
requires a number of additional measures that will tackle a number of other bar-
riers that developing countries face, such as non-tariff barriers in the EU and the 
absence of sound domestic agricultural policies (see also Kuyvenhoven and 
Stolwijk, 2011). 
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1.2 Objective and research question 
 
To assess the impact of a reformed CAP on developing countries, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs1 has asked LEI Wageningen UR to conduct a study on the 
impact of a reformed CAP on developing countries. In addition, this study will 
analyse the proposed changes in agricultural trade policies of the EU. We also 
discuss the EU policies in the context of China's increasing role in world trade. 
The impact on developing countries are assessed in terms of prices and trade 
including domestic markets. 
 Research questions: 
- What is the (relative) impact of the reformed European Common Agricultural 
Policy in 2014 on developing countries, in terms of prices, trade, and do-
mestic markets? 
- How is the CAP related to its agricultural trade policies, and what is the rela-
tive impact of those on developing countries, in terms of prices, trade, and 
domestic markets? 
- In the context of global developments, what is the relative role of China in 
world trade compared to the EU? 
 
 
1.3 Research methodology 
 
It is important to note that developing countries are very heterogeneous in the 
way they are affected by changes in world food prices and changes in the CAP. 
Klavert et al. (2011) observe that analysing the implications of the CAP for de-
veloping countries is difficult because the CAP is a highly complex policy includ-
ing a wide range of measures. The effects of the CAP on developing countries 
depend on (European Commission, 2011a; Matthews, 2011c; Matthews, 
2011b; Matthews and Gallezot, 2006): 
- the commodity composition of their trade (whether these are commodities 
protected by the CAP); 
- whether they are net-importers or net-exporters of these commodities; 
- their preferential status (EBA, EPA or GSP); 
- the economic structure of the country; 
- their own agricultural policies. 
 
                                                 
1 Formerly Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation or EL&I. 
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 Different agricultural trade policies will also affect various developing coun-
tries and sectors differently as well. We have therefore chosen to focus this 
study on four specific commodity groups: dairy, fruits, vegetables and sugar. 
These four commodity groups have been selected based on the fact that they 
constitute significant shares in the trade between the EU and developing coun-
tries. In addition, sugar and dairy are more heavily regulated in the Single Com-
mon Market Organisation (CMO). Changes in policies for sugar and dairy will 
thus have a larger impact on developing countries than those for fruits and veg-
etables, which are less regulated (Massot Marti, 2008). 
 The assessment of the impact of a reformed CAP and EU agricultural trade 
policy has been done based on a combination of literature study and data analy-
sis. We did a literature study to present an overview of the literature on impact 
of a reformed CAP and EU trade policy on developing countries. In addition, 
trade data was analysed to identify how a reformed CAP and agricultural trade 
policies will affect individual countries for the four selected sectors.  
 We used UN Comtrade data for exports and imports (in USD) between the 
EU-27 and developing countries between 2005 and 2010.1 This period is 
somewhat arbitrary, but we assume that it reflects well the importance of trade 
values for these countries. Taking only one year will give a skewed picture be-
cause trade values and volumes often fluctuate between years. The developing 
countries were categorised into four groups: (1) LDCs, (2) ACP countries, (3) 
LDC and ACP countries and (4) 'miscellaneous' meaning they belong neither to 
the LDC or ACP category. 
 We extracted import and export data from and to the EU-27 for dairy, fruits, 
vegetables and sugar2 as well as values of total import and export of agricultur-
al products from or to the world. By dividing the import or export values for 
specific products by the total value of imports or exports to the world, we ob-
tained the share of imports or exports from or to the EU-27 in total agricultural 
imports or exports. We used this share to represent the vulnerability of a partic-
ular sector within a particular country to EU policy changes.  
 The choice of countries was according to LCD status, ACP membership and 
income. All countries in the South belonging to the low-income, lower-middle-
income and upper-middle-income economies were considered to be developing 
                                                 
1 The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) contains detailed imports 
and exports statistics reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries or areas. UN 
Comtrade is considered the most comprehensive trade database available with more than 1 billion 
records. See for more information www.comtrade.un.org. 
2 In the Comtrade database: (i) Dairy, (ii) Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons, (iii) Edible 
vegetables and certain roots and tubers, (iv) Sugars and sugar confectionery. 
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countries and included in the analysis. The classifications are listed and ex-
plained in appendix 6. It may be argued that countries belonging to the upper-
middle income category are not strictly developing countries. For completeness 
sake, we included them anyway, categorising them as 'miscellaneous' category. 
The same applies to the ACP group, of which a few members are upper-middle-
income or even high-income countries (Equatorial Guinea). 
 
 
1.4 Outline of the report 
 
Chapter 2 provides a short overview of the development of the CAP through the 
years, with a focus on the proposals for the CAP 2014-2020. In chapter 3, the 
EU agricultural trade policies are explained. Chapter 4 analyses the vulnerability 
of the four sectors for changes in the CAP and EU agricultural trade policies for 
different developing countries. In chapter 5 conclusions are drawn on develop-
ing countries' vulnerability to a reformed CAP and agricultural trade policies. 
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2 Development of the CAP towards 2020 
 
 
The process of CAP reform started in 1992 and major reforms were made 
again in 1999 with the 'Agenda 2000'. In 2003, a further round of reforms was 
initiated, with additional sector-specific reform in 2005 and a CAP 'health check' 
involving further reforms in 2008. A major round of reforms is scheduled for 
2014. In September 2011, after a period of public consultation and deliberation 
within the EC services and stakeholders, the European Commission put forward 
several proposals for reform. These became subject of intense debate within 
the EU Council, the European Parliament and the agricultural sector in general. 
Formal regulations were proposed in the course of 2012. It is expected that fi-
nal approval to specific changes being agreed beginning of 20141 (Agritrade, 
2012). 
 In summary, the CAP proposals maintain the current structure of the CAP 
with two pillars. Pillar 1 contains the annual mandatory measures of general ap-
plication (direct payments and market management measures). This is comple-
mented by voluntary measures under a multi-annual programming approach in 
pillar 2 (rural development policy). More synergy and coordination both between 
the two pillars of the CAP and between the rural development policy of pillar 2 
and other EU structural funds is an important aim.  
 Five main regulations are in place: direct payments, market measures (single 
CMO), rural development, the Common Strategic Framework, which also in-
cludes the rules for other EU structural funds, and a horizontal regulation, which 
not only contains financial management, but also brings together other common 
provisions. The proposals on direct payments and market measures potentially 
have the most impact on developing countries. These proposals are summa-
rised below. It must be noted that these proposals are prone to changes, as 
they were still being discussed at the time of writing this report. Figure 2.1 
shows how the focus of CAP expenditures are expected to change after 2013. 
 
                                                 
1 At the start of 2013, at the time of writing, some doubted whether this date would be feasible. See 
for instance Alan Matthews’ blog http://capreform.eu/welcome-to-the-irish-presidency/ accessed 
14 January 2013. See also Anania (2012) for a description of the complicated process for decision 
making by the EC, the European parliament and the Council of the European Union.  
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Figure 2.1 Path of CAP expenditures 1980-2020 
 
Source: DG Agriculture and rural development. 
 
 
2.1 Direct payments 
 
Direct payments are made directly to farmers to support their incomes. In con-
trast, price support supplements the incomes of farmers by supporting the 
prices they receive for their products. The reform of the common agricultural 
policy in 1992 reduced the level of price support. To prevent a corresponding 
fall in the incomes of farmers, direct payments were introduced to compensate 
farmers for the lower prices they received in the market. The coupled payments 
are commodity specific and an addition to the price received. Increasing the EU 
price in this way encourages EU production. The 2003 reform of the CAP intro-
duced decoupling of direct payments as the general rule. However, within the 
framework set out by the Council, Member States may choose to keep some of 
their direct payments coupled to production to a certain extent.  
 The European Commission proposes restricting the direct payments system 
to a 'flat rate model'. The diversity of Single Payments Schemes in the EU-15 
(historic, flat rate and hybrid models) and the Simplified Area Payments Scheme 
in the EU-12 will be replaced by one model with a national or regional flat rate 
per eligible hectare. The proposal for the CAP 2014-2020, instead, introduces a 
number of payment schemes: 
- Basic Payments: a uniform payment per hectare at national or regional level. 
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- Greening Payment: payment per hectare for respecting certain agricultural 
practices beneficial for the climate and the environment. Three measures 
are foreseen: maintaining permanent pasture, crop diversification and main-
taining an ecological focus area of 7% of farmland. Member States are 
obliged to use 30% of their national envelope for this scheme. 
- Young Farmer Scheme: a top-up payment of 25% for starting young farmers 
(< 40) for the first five years (not for large farms). This scheme shall be 
funded by up to 2% of the national envelope. 
- Coupled support: the Commission reintroduces the option of coupled sup-
port in order to address the adverse effects of a redistribution of direct 
payments. These have been abolished for most products, but the Commis-
sion intends to reintroduce these payments for suckler cows, goats and 
sheep. Member States may use up to 5% or even 10% of their national enve-
lope for this support. 
- Natural constraints support: additional payments may be granted to farmers 
in areas with national constraints. Member States may use up to 5% of their 
national envelope for this support. 
- Small Farmer Scheme: as an alternative for the schemes mentioned above, 
the Commission also proposes a simple and specific scheme for small 
farmers (< 3 ha). These farmers may choose to receive a lump-sum pay-
ment replacing all other direct payments. Small farmers will be exempt from 
greening and face less stringent cross-compliance requirements and con-
trols. Member States may use up to 10% of the national envelope1 for this 
scheme. 
 
 Besides these payments and support schemes, some other, new, elements 
in the direct payment system are in place: 
- Cross compliance: the basic requirements concerning environment, animal 
welfare and plant and animal health standards will continue to be conditional 
for farmers in order to receive payments and support. However, the number 
of existing cross compliance rules will be reduced and some new require-
ments resulting from the Water Framework Directive and the Sustainable 
Use of Pesticides Directive will be added. 
- Definition of active farmer: in order to make sure that payments will only be 
provided to recipients, which can be viewed as 'active farmers', applicants 
whose direct payments are less than 5% of their total receipts from all non-
                                                 
1 National envelopes refer to the overall ceiling on the funding for direct payments allocated to each 
Member State. 
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agricultural activities or, which do not carry out the minimum agricultural ac-
tivity are excluded. 
- Capping: the amount of support to individual farms from the Basic Payment 
Scheme will be limited to € 300,000 per year. Between € 150,000 and 
€ 300,000 support is decreased in a degressive manner. In case of hold-
ings with (many) employees, the costs of salaries may be deducted before 
the reduction is applied. 
- Eligibility of land: the year 2014 will be set as a new reference year for land 
areas, but in order to avoid speculation (holdings quickly buying land to prof-
it from the area payment) a link to beneficiaries of the direct payments sys-
tem will be made in 2011. 
- Transferring funds between pillars: Member States in the EU-15 may shift up 
to 10% of their Direct Payments envelope to their Rural Development enve-
lope, while Member States in the EU-12 may transfer up to 5% of their Rural 
Development envelope to their Pillar One envelope. 
 
 Direct decoupled payments, which are described as non-distorting, still tend 
to distort trade somewhat due to the sheer scale of these payments. According 
to EU figures, direct payments make up 28% of agricultural income for the EU-
27 (total subsidies make up 40%), which means that many farms could not exist 
without CAP support (Matthews, 2011a). 
 The Scenar 2020-II study (Nowicki et al., 2009) finds that under the liberali-
sation scenario, where direct payments are completely abolished, farm income 
in the EU-27 would decline by 15% more until 2020 than under the reference 
scenario. The number of farms is estimated to decrease considerably. Howev-
er, reducing direct payments will imply lower land prices, which enables large 
parts of EU agriculture to remain competitive and thus EU production is not 
enormously affected by further liberalisation. Others, however, predict that a re-
duction in direct payments would reduce EU supply through reduced land-use 
and therefore may increase world prices (ODI, 2011; Klavert, Engel, and Koeb, 
2011). 
 
 
2.2 Market measures 
 
The Single Common Market Organisation (sCMO) provides the legal framework 
for the market instruments currently available for domestic markets, trade with 
third countries and rules regarding competition (European Commission, 2011a). 
Figure 2.1 shows that market measures are to be reduced considerably in 
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terms of financial support. The current market measures that are expected to 
be continued consist of: 
- Private storage aid, which represents a first layer of market management, 
as it is triggered, as a general rule, at a price level, which is closer to mar-
ket prices (above the intervention price level).  
- Public intervention, which is foreseen for cereals, rice, skimmed milk powder 
(SMP), butter and beef. Intervention prices, triggering mechanisms, calen-
dars and quantitative ceilings vary across sectors.  
- Special intervention measures and special measures in case of market dis-
turbances, which can be implemented at member state or regional level un-
der specific circumstances for certain sectors (e.g. in cases where prices 
on the EU market rise and/or fall significantly). 
- Production quotas, which have been an important instrument for market sta-
bilisation, in sectors facing overproduction, notably the dairy, sugar and wine 
sectors. Dairy and sugar quotas are set to expire following the respective 
2014/2015 quota year (also see sections 4.2 and 4.3 on dairy and sugar). 
 
 The EU intends to keep a market orientation in a reformed CAP after 2013 
to maintain the competitiveness of EU agriculture, but at the same time provid-
ing a safety net for farmers in case of strong market disruptions. Maintaining 
stable commodity markets and farm incomes are the main objectives here. The 
EU proposes to alleviate tight producer margins by improving distribution of val-
ue added along the food chain. It aims to achieve this by strengthening bargain-
ing power of farmers, promoting more effective contractual relations and 
enhancing price transmission and transparency along the food chain. The EU 
proposes to simplify and streamline existing instruments because the whole 
system of market measures is complex (European Commission, 2011a).  
 
 
2.3 Intervention prices 
 
When market prices for an agricultural product fall below a certain level, the 
public authorities of the member states intervene to stabilise the market by pur-
chasing surplus supplies, which may then be stored until the market price in-
creases, exported to a third country or disposed of in an alternative way.  
Public intervention by the EU at fixed prices will be decreased. It remains availa-
ble for cereals, beef and veal, butter and skimmed milk powder, but only for 
quantities fixed in advance or at very low prices. Since 2009-10, no cereals 
apart from soft wheat have been eligible for intervention (ODI, 2011). Within the 
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WTO, intervention prices are considered to be trade distorting as they artificially 
raise prices above a certain level and are part of the EU's reduction commit-
ments from the Uruguay round. 
 
 
2.4 Export subsidies 
 
Under the CAP, export subsidies, also called export subsidies, can be intro-
duced as a compensation to producers when export prices on the world market 
are lower than producer prices in the EU. The WTO members have found export 
subsidies to be trade-distorting. Both the EU and US have therefore committed 
to lowering their expenditures on this type of support under the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture of the GATT. The EU has indeed reduced its use of 
export subsidies over the past decade, which has had far-reaching consequenc-
es in several sectors. The WTO commitments on export subsidies has limited 
the use of intervention prices and stockpiling in the EU. Subsequent CAP re-
forms that have reduced interventionist market policies cleared the road for a 
near total elimination. Their use was further minimised in recent years of high 
food prices (Figure 2.2). See Appendix 3 for EU export subsidies for sugar, 
dairy and fruits and vegetables 2003-2009. 
 
Figure 2.2 A decade of declining use of export subsidies 
 
Source: Various budget reports of the European Commission, 2012b; European Commission, 2012c.1 
 
 Export subsidies for fruit and vegetables were abolished in 2008 and sugar 
export subsidies set at zero from 2008/09, while subsidies for milk and milk 
                                                 
1 The figures are also cited in (ODI 2011) but differ from the figures mentioned in 'Myths and Facts; 
EU budget myths' published on the website of the EC (accessed January 2013): 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/myths/myths_en.cfm#9of15. We cannot explain the differ-
ence. 
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products set at zero from November 2009. The proposal to abolish export sub-
sidies was actually made as part of the Doha Round under the WTO, which, if 
agreement was reached, would involve the elimination of export subsidies by 
2013. The Doha Development Agenda, as it was optimistically called at the out-
set, has made little progress in recent years, and it is not expected it will be 
concluded in the near future.  
 Export subsidies are thus still on the table. Most recently, these subsidies 
have been used mostly for dairy (see Figure 4.1), beef, eggs and poultry (in 
2009/2010 to 2011/2012; European Commission 2012c). Despite the limited 
effects of export subsidies in recent years, the fact that the EU may use them 
creates disincentives in developing countries to invest in sectors that may be 
harmed if the EU does use export subsidies (Revoredo et al., 2011). 
 Revoredo et al. (2011) as well as Renwick et al. (2010) provide an overview 
of studies that assessed the impact of (eliminating) export subsidies on develop-
ing countries. In general, the majority of studies found that elimination of export 
subsidies would lead to an increase in world prices, but would have a limited 
impact on the trade volumes and welfare of developing countries (see also Bou-
et, 2008; Fabiosa et al., 2005). It must be noted that the net negative effects 
depend on the particularities of the domestic markets in specific countries (see 
also Anderson and Martin, 2006a; Anderson and Martin, 2006b; Boulanger, 
2009).  
 Others have stretched the definition of export subsidies to also include im-
plicit export subsidies that arise from domestic support payments. The Europe-
an NGO confederation for relief and development (CONCORD) therefore 
recommended to the EC in 2011 that 
 
'any product that receives product specific support should not be exported 
to developing countries. If exported, the value of its specific subsidy should 
be added to its export value' (CONCORD, 2011). 
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3 EU agricultural trade policies 
 
 
EU agricultural trade policies are important to developing countries' agricultural 
trade because it determines their market access to the EU. Developing coun-
tries benefit from preferential import conditions to the EU, which effectively im-
plies that the EU charges lower taxes at the border on products from 
developing countries than other suppliers. There are several schemes for pref-
erential access, most notably the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).  
 We discuss the main elements of the EU trade policy and how they affect the 
different developing countries below. The treatment of agriculture in the prefer-
ential trade schemes is generally complex; in this section we will only touch on 
the main features. For more extensive discussions, we refer the reader to Can-
dau and Jean (2009) for a recent quantitative account and, for a more general 
and historical introduction, to Achterbosch et al. (2003). 
 
 
3.1 Import tariffs 
 
It is common practice for countries to levy taxes at the border on imported 
products. These taxes are commonly referred to as import tariffs. The size of 
the tax, or tariff rate, differs by a detailed product list. Several commodity im-
ports, including cocoa, coffee, and oilseeds, face low import tariffs. Others, 
such as sugar, dairy products or beef, face high tariffs and therefore a high lev-
el of protection. Developing countries will find it difficult to export these prod-
ucts to the EU unless they have preferential tariff concessions under a particular 
regime. 
 To calculate the average EU import tariff, various assumptions need to be 
made, as explained by Alan Matthews in his blog post 'Will the right tariff aver-
age stand up?'.1 The 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN2) tariff structure of the EU 
features a high level of complexity. Thousands of product-specific tariffs exist, 
which are calculated on the value of imports, the volume of imports or both. The 
                                                 
1 Available from the CapReform.eu at http://capreform.eu/will-the-right-tariff-average-stand-up/ 
2 Most Favoured Nation treatment requires that when a member of the World Trade Organisation 
grants an advantage to one country, then it must give the same treatment to all other countries that 
belong to the WTO. The purpose of this principle is to ensure that no discrimination is made between 
the countries that belong to the WTO. This principle is found in Article I of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 as well as in other agreements. 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/glossary/index_en.htm. 
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WTO (2011) has estimated that the simple average of applied 'Most Favoured 
Nation' (MFN)1 tariffs on agricultural commodities are over 15% in 2011, with 
much variation around the average (the standard deviation is 18.9). These are 
high compared to 4.1% for manufactures imports.  
 The high variation is explained by the fact that most of the tariff peaks relate 
to agriculture, engineered to shield specific farming sectors in the EU from 
global competition, in particular the dairy, beef and grains sectors. For products 
in these sectors, the EU has several two-tier tariff schemes in place. The so-
called tariff rate quotas include a jump in the tariff when a predetermined quanti-
ty of imports into the market has been reached. As a result, the import tariffs 
paid by countries on the MFN status average 54% for milk products, 34% for 
grains and 32% for meat (data from ODI, 2011). All this implies that trade pref-
erences are a meaningful asset for a developing country to obtain access the 
EU markets (see 3.3).  
 
 
3.2 Nominal Protection Coefficients 
 
The OECD publishes an annual overview of Nominal Protection Coefficients 
(NPCs), which measures the ratio between the average price received by pro-
ducers at farm gate, including payments per tonne of current output, and the 
border price, measured at farm gate (OECD, 2012). The NPC is thus derived 
from the difference between domestic and world market prices at the farm gate 
level, i.e. adjusting the border price of the imported food for marketing margins 
as well as quality and quantity differences. 
 The EU reforms of market regimes for key agricultural commodities have 
moved domestic prices for key agricultural commodities closer to the border 
price levels, with the price differential between internal EU prices and world 
prices falling from 33% in 1995-97 to 5% in 2009-11. In 2009, EU sugar prices 
were 19% above world market prices but this differential disappeared in 2011. 
The impact of the recent increase in world market prices has also led to the rap-
id decline in the NPC for some commodities (OECD, 2012). Although these low 
NPCs suggest very limited market price support from border protection and 
                                                 
1 Most Favoured Nation treatment requires that when a member of the World Trade Organisation 
grants an advantage to one country, then it must give the same treatment to all other countries that 
belong to the WTO. The purpose of this principle is to ensure that no discrimination is made between 
the countries that belong to the WTO. This principle is found in Article I of General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade 1994 as well as in other agreements. 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/glossary/index_en.htm. 
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some coupled payments, the EU still levies rather high tariffs on imported food-
stuffs (see above) (Matthews, 2012).  
 
 
3.3 EU trade policies for developing countries 
 
3.3.1 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
 
The GSP was established in 1971 to allow developing countries unilateral, non-
reciprocal tariff preferences. Gradually, the EU expanded the range of benefi-
ciaries and offered greater benefits for the least developed countries. The aim 
of the EU is to help developing countries to export their products to the Europe-
an Union through GSP, in the form of reduced tariffs for their goods. The GSP is 
subject to WTO law, which allows for an exception to the WTO 'most-favoured 
nation' principle (i.e. equal treatment should be accorded to all WTO Members). 
In addition, the EU revised the GSP rules of origin in 2011 to address the criti-
cism that rigid rules of origin impede developing countries from making full use 
of EU preferences (European Commission, 2012d). 
 Under the old GSP regulation, 176 countries were eligible under: 
1. 'Standard' GSP: generous preferences: duty reduction for around 66% of all 
tariff lines the beneficiaries in general. Until the new GSP, 111 countries and 
territories enjoyed these reductions 
2. GSP+: set up in 2006, providing additional preferences to 16 beneficiaries, 
termed enhanced preferences, because countries ratify and implement in-
ternational conventions relating to human and labour rights, environment and 
good governance. Zero duties for the same 66% tariff lines as under GSP. 
3. Everything But Arms (EBA) introduced in 2001, which allows duty-free ac-
cess by all imports from LDCs with no restrictions on quantity, with the ex-
ception of arms and munitions. 
 
 The EU adopted a new GSP on 31 October 2012, which will apply as of 1 
January 2014. The new scheme will maintain GSP and GSP+ but will focus on 
fewer beneficiaries: 89 countries. For the new GSP+, the developing countries 
must show binding commitment to ratify 27 conventions, which include human 
rights, good governance, climate change, etc., to accept monitoring, and to 
cooperate with the EU (European Commission 2012i).  
 The 89 countries consist of 49 least developed countries in the Everything 
But Arms scheme, and 40 other low and lower-middle income partner. There is 
no topical list of the new GSP+ countries yet, as all candidates are required to 
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renew their applications for this status. This makes the analysis in this report 
somewhat hypothetical, but we assume that the 89 countries eligible will remain 
so. 
 The countries that no longer benefit are (European Commission, 2012b): 
- The 'overseas countries and territories' (33). This category consists of main-
ly EU territories, which have their own market access regulation - and thus 
do not use GSP to enter the EU. Reform will be in general neutral for them. 
- Countries that enjoy another trade arrangement with the EU, which provides 
substantially equivalent coverage as compared to GSP (in total 34). This 
category includes countries with a Free Trade Agreement or with autono-
mous arrangements (such as the bridging Market Access Regulation for 
countries that have negotiated an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
but not yet signed and ratified). Given that use of GSP is marginal for these 
countries, reform will in general be neutral for them. 
- Finally, countries that have been listed by the World Bank as high or upper 
middle income economies for the past three years are excluded (in total 20). 
 
 New countries that can now apply for the new GSP+ are Philippines, Paki-
stan, Ukraine because the so-called 'vulnerability criterion' has been relaxed.  
 The new GSP maintains the core principles behind graduation. Graduation 
means that imports of particular groups of products and originating in a given 
beneficiary country lose GSP preferences. The new GSP includes a few chang-
es, one of which is relevant for our study: graduation no longer applies to GSP+ 
countries because like EBA countries (for which graduation does not apply), 
GSP+ countries are also vulnerable and display a non-diversifies export base. 
Out of a total of over 2400 country-product group combinations that exist, 20 
(less than 1%) have been graduated (European Commission, 2012i).  
 See Appendix 4 for a list of agricultural graduated sectors. See Appendix 5 
for a list of countries that fall under the new GSP and GSP+. 
 
3.3.2 ACP countries preferential trade agreements  
 
The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) is an organisation cre-
ated by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975 and consists of 79 Member-States, 
all save Cuba signatories to the Cotonou Agreement that binds them to the Eu-
ropean Union: 48 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 from the Caribbean 
and 15 from the Pacific (see appendix 2 for a complete list). The ACP group 
was traditionally positioned above GSP beneficiaries in the EU pyramid of pref-
erences.  
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 Under the Cotonou Agreement, the EU granted non-reciprocal trade prefer-
ences to ACP countries. The rules of origin stipulated the conditions under 
which this preferential access was to be enjoyed by the beneficiary countries 
(European Commission, 2012f). However, the Cotonou Agreement was also 
meant as a forum for concluding Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs, see 
section 3.3.3), which would replace non-reciprocal trade preferences from 
2008 onwards. The main reason for replacing this system of non-reciprocal 
trade preferences is because these are incompatible with WTO rules.  
 The new GSP will affect all ACP countries, either directly or indirectly. A 
small number of countries are affected directly because the GSP is the only 
preferential safety net that is available for their exports to the EU. This will be 
taken over by the EPAs as explained above, but only if they reach an acceptable 
conclusion before the temporary Market Access Regulation expires (see section 
3.3.3 on EPAs). The current GSP regime does not offer equivalent preferences 
on key exports to those that the ACP countries receive at present, and the 
modest extensions to the new GSP do not alter this picture (Agritrade, 2013). 
Another, very small group will be excluded as GSP beneficiaries because they 
have been reclassified as upper or middle income countries.  
 The remaining ACP countries will be affected indirectly because changes to 
the GSP will change the competitive advantage that they enjoy over other sup-
pliers to the EU market. The preferences of current ACP and LDC exporters will 
in general erode because the EU is concluding bilateral trade agreements with 
other regions (e.g. in Central America). In addition, the ACP and LDC countries 
are confronted with higher costs of supplying the EU market (e.g. due to sani-
tary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations), and dispute settlements in the WTO 
(e.g. bananas).  
 
3.3.3 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
 
The EPA negotiations started in 2002 and were supposed to end on 1 January 
2008, which was set as the deadline for bringing the EC-ACP trade regime into 
conformity with WTO rules.1 As of 1 January 2008, the provisions of the Market 
Access Regulation (MAR) entered into force as a temporary unilateral scheme 
for countries that have negotiated an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
but have not yet signed and ratified (European Commission, 2012f). The MAR 
                                                 
1 The Annex V of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, among, which the Protocol concerning the defi-
nition of the concept of 'originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation, expired on 
31 December 2007 (European Commission 2012f). 
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governs the EU import regime for 36 ACP countries that are in the process of 
negotiating EPAs. The MAR provides duty-free quota-free (DFQF) market access 
to these 36 ACP countries.  
 The process of concluding EPAs has been slow. Only one full EPA was 
signed between the EC and the CARIFORUM in 2008. The Agreement will official-
ly enter into force pending the completion of the process of ratification by the 
member states. In the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) group, Comoros and 
Zambia have initialled the agreement, indicating they will sign at a later date. 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe have signed an interim 
agreement with the EU in August 2009. To date, only the Seychelles have rati-
fied the Agreement. The reason for these delays is that the ACP negotiating 
countries are reluctant to join EPAs for fear of the damaging effects of in-
creased market competition from EU imports, especially in sensitive areas like 
agriculture and services (ICTSD & ECDPM, 2011; Ramdoo and Bilal, 2011). In 
addition, for governments whose revenue is heavily dependent on import tariffs, 
the reduction of tariffs will represent a substantial loss of public revenue, espe-
cially for those countries that have high import tariffs (Dodd, 2008; Perez, 
2006). A reduction of import tariffs would nonetheless benefit consumers in de-
veloping countries.  
 So far, the ACP countries that have not initialled an interim EPA have not ex-
perienced any trade disruptions, as they have been able to fall back either on 
the 'Everything But Arms' (EBA) regime or the standard EU Generalised System 
of Preferences (GSP). Based on the Cotonou principle of differentiation, not all 
ACP countries are required to open their markets to EU products after 2008. 
The group of least developed countries is able to either continue cooperation 
under the arrangements made under the 'Everything But Arms' regulation. Non-
LDCs that decide they do not want to enter into an EPA can for example be 
transferred into the EU's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), or the Spe-
cial Incentive arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance 
(GSP+). 
 In 2011 the European Commission put renewed pressure on the EPAs by 
proposing changes to the Market Access Regulation. The European Commission 
announced on 30 September that countries that have signed an Economic Part-
nership Agreement (EPA) with the EU but without having taken the steps to ratify 
and implement it, will be withdrawn from the Market Access Regulation as of 1 
January 2014 onward. Eighteen countries (14 countries in the Caribbean, Mad-
agascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Papua New Guinea) have taken the neces-
sary steps towards ratification of initialled agreements, and will continue to use 
the facility. The remaining 18 countries that have not even signed the agree-
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ment could potentially lose their free access to the EU market (European Com-
mission, 2011c; ICTSD & ECDPM, 2011). 
 The European Commission has outlined what the effects are on developing 
countries that decide to opt out of an EPA (European Commission, 2011c, 2). 
The nine LDCs (Burundi, the Comoros, Haiti, Lesotho, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia) could benefit from DFQF access to the EU under the 
Everything But Arms scheme. The seven low income or lower middle income 
countries (Cameroon, Fiji, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Swaziland, Zimbabwe) 
could benefit from the new GSP regime, which is less advantageous, but still 
generous. The last two countries, Botswana and Namibia, are currently upper 
middle-income countries and, if this status is confirmed in three consecutive 
years, would not qualify for preferential access under the new GSP. 
 
3.3.4 Doha Development Agenda 
 
The EU remains a supporter of the Doha Development Agenda, believing it will 
bring benefits to the global trading system. Some of the elements of the CAP 
proposals have been made part of the Doha Agenda, such as proposal to abol-
ish export subsidies. If agreement were reached, this would involve the elimina-
tion of export subsidies by 2013. Little progress has been made in the Doha 
Development Round, and some expect this will change in the short term for 
many reasons (Matthews, 2011b).  
 Numerous studies have examined the failure of the Round. Decreux and 
Fontagé (2011) put forward several explanations why reaching an agreement is 
difficult. The estimated global GDP gains from further global tariff reform appear 
to be relatively modest, and may also be achieved through bilateral trade 
agreements. Some regions may lose out from further trade liberalisation, specif-
ically Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), North Africa, Mexico and the Caribbean. This 
partly reflects a preference erosion. Bureau and Jean (2012) find that the Doha 
agenda does not meet pressing issues such as including importer's rights to 
food in times of scarce export supplies and government-pushed biofuel mar-
kets. 
 Numerous studies examined the results of the Doha Development Round, 
which have so far been rather disappoinging. Decreux and Fontagé (2011) put 
forward several explanations why reaching an agreement is difficult. The esti-
mated global GDP gains from further global tariff reform appear to be relatively 
modest, and may also be achieved through bilateral trade agreements. Some 
regions may lose out from further trade liberalisation, specifically Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), North Africa, Mexico and the Caribbean. This partly reflects a pref-
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erence erosion. Bureau and Jean (2012) find that the Doha agenda does not 
meet pressing issues such as including importer's rights to food in times of 
scarce export supplies and government-pushed biofuel markets. 
 Nonetheless, it is expected that the Doha Development Round will continue 
at the 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali in December 2013, where countries will 
attempt to 'harvest' the agreements already made as result of earlier negotia-
tion and to find further agreement on remaining subjects. The negotiations 
proper are described as a 'single undertaking' meaning that they form a single 
package of about 20 subjects, to be signed by each country with a single signa-
ture without any option to pick and choose between different subject. Important 
issues for developing countries include special and differential treatment provi-
sions, duty-free quota-free market access, and rules-of-origin. 
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4 Vulnerability of dairy, sugar and fruits 
and vegetables sectors of developing 
countries 
 
 
4.1 Impact of high prices 
 
In the past five years, the prices of several key agricultural commodities have 
peaked twice: in 2007/08 and 2010/11. The effects of high prices on develop-
ing countries are mixed (Aksoy and Hoekman, 2010). High prices are favourable 
for net exporters of agricultural commodities. After years of depressed prices, 
which were blamed for stifling agricultural productivity and growth, prices are 
peaking again. But high prices appear to be a mixed blessing, as many poor net 
consumer households face increasing costs when buying food. Swinnen (2011) 
argues that the size of the benefits to producers and losses to consumers of 
high prices depends on various factors. He mentions several complicating fac-
tors in determining the effect of high world prices on developing countries: 
1. The distinction between producers and consumers may not be so simple. 
Many rural households in developing countries are both producers and con-
sumers of food and are thus affected in different ways by price changes. 
The net household effect depends on their net consumption status1.  
2. The change in world-market prices may differ from the change in the local 
prices and the latter may even differ for local producers and local consum-
ers, as these changes are affected by various policies (trade policy, taxes, 
etc.), by infrastructure and institutions, and by the industrial organisation of 
the food chain.  
3. Local production and consumption may also affect local prices, in addition 
to exogenous external shocks. These exogenous shocks may be caused by 
nature (for example, the weather) or by humans (for example, changes in 
trade policies or consumption or production in other countries).  
4. Short-run effects may differ from long-run effects, as pass-through may take 
some time 
 
                                                 
1 Net consumption is what is left for own consumption after a rural household has sold part of its 
production. 
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 The fact that there are both winners and losers of high food prices (and 
therefore also of low food prices) is illustrated by the fact that during the years 
before the price hike of 2006, attention focused on low food prices and policies 
that brought the world food prices down, such as import tariffs, production and 
export subsidies, etc. These low prices hurt producers in developing countries 
and therefore many recommended such policies should be removed (see for 
example Ray et al., 2003). Especially rich-country export subsidies ('dumping'), 
which pushed prices down on international markets, were a cause for dismay 
(Swinnen, 2011). 
 The volatility of prices seem another concern because it introduces uncer-
tainty (OECD and FAO, 2011). At a micro-level, it makes planning difficult for 
both consumers and producers. At a more macro-level, it also makes planning 
and budgeting more difficult for food importing governments. The OECD-FAO 
Agricultural Outlook 2011-2020 expects that prices will be on a higher plateau 
and that high volatility will remain (OECD and FAO, 2011). 
 The high and volatile world prices for several agricultural commodities have 
led to an increased focus on the effect of world prices of the proposed CAP 
changes for 2013-2020. A recent study by Boulanger et al. (2010) calculates 
that the abolition of the CAP would shift average world prices 1-4% upwards. It 
must be noted that these are averages, the impact will vary across commodi-
ties and countries. However, the price effect of an elimination of the CAP seems 
to be relatively small. 
 
 
4.2 Dairy  
 
4.2.1 EU dairy policies 
 
Milk production is important in EU agriculture, comprising 14 percent of the val-
ue of EU's total agricultural production. The EU's export surplus is small, around 
2 per cent of the value of total agricultural production, but this accounts for 
over a third of total world dairy exports (European Union, 2012). Other major 
exporters of dairy are New Zealand, the US and Argentina, accounting for al-
most half of total world dairy exports together.  
 The Common Market Organisation (CMO) for milk and milk products has tra-
ditionally differed in some respects from the CMOs in other sectors. Raw milk is 
a highly perishable product, which is not easy to store or transport, which is 
why market support has focused on first-stage processing products, principally 
butter. skimmed milk powder and cheese. The first EU dairy regulation dates 
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back to 1964 and this instituted the basic management of the dairy products 
market. A consolidated regulation was adopted in 1968, which formed the basis 
for the dairy policy until 2008, when a single CMO for the whole CAP was creat-
ed. The original aim of the European dairy policy was the management of the 
markets for dairy products to secure product prices that permit milk producers 
to obtain a fair standard of living. 
 The current dairy CMO has several market support mechanisms; the most 
important ones are: 
- Limited intervention buying (with intervention prices) of butter and skim milk 
powder to protect the domestic market against disruptions caused by sea-
sonal and structural surpluses;  
- Limits on milk production through a milk quota system at national level 
(since 1984), which will expire in 2015;  
- From 2004 to 2007 milk producers received a dairy premium as compensa-
tion for phased cuts in the intervention price. In 2007 the premium has been 
integrated in the Single Farm Payment;  
- Import tariffs on dairy products;  
- The use of export subsidies1 to bring prices of EU dairy products down to 
the international market level. Between June 2007 and August 2011, no ex-
ports subsidies have been applied on dairy products due to high world mar-
ket prices, except during the period from January to November 2009 (Figure 
4.1).  
- With the planned abolition of the production quotas and the incorporation of 
premiums in the Single Farm Payments, support to dairy farmers has been 
shifted from production and price support towards income support, which 
should make the dairy policy more market-oriented and less trade-distortive. 
 
                                                 
1 Also termed export subsidies. We use the term export subsidies throughout the report. 
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Figure 4.1 Export subsidies for dairy projects (2005-2012) in Euro/kg 
 
NB SMP = skim milk powder and WMP = whole milk powder. 
Source: DairyCo Market Information, 2011. 
 
 Import tariffs apply for the majority of dairy products. These are subject to 
the conditions and limits established in the WTO Uruguay Round (see Table 4.1). 
Imports of dairy products are allowed into the EU, although stringent consumer 
safety and animal health requirements apply, at reduced import duties up to a 
set quota volume for certain products, from:  
- any country under the import opportunities created by the GATT/WTO 'Uru-
guay Round'. These were phased in over 6 years, reaching a maximum in 
2000/01 and will remain unchanged until a new WTO Agreement is signed.  
- applicant countries, under the 'Europe Agreements', aimed at establishing a 
free trade area, and eventually membership of the EU. These imports have 
duty reduced by at least 80%. The maximum quantity subject to this reduced 
rate is increased year by year, with reciprocal arrangements allowing EU 
imports at reduced rates into these countries. Free trade is established 
once these states become members of the EU  
- the 46 ACP countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific), up to a set volume, 
with a 65% reduction in customs duties (i.e. 65% reduction for 1,000 tonnes 
of condensed milk, 65% reduction for 1,000 tonnes of cheese, and 16% re-
duction on an unlimited imports of other dairy products. 
- Turkey, with no duty applied  
- South Africa, with no duty applied. 
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- For the world's 48 Least Developed Countries duty- and quota-free access is 
applied. 
 
Table 4.1 WTO ceilings on annual subsidised dairy exports from the EU 
Product category  Quantity ('000t)  Expenditure (million €)  
Butter & butteroil  411.6  945.8  
Skim milk powder  323.4  298  
Cheese  331.7  345.7  
Other milk products  1 008.9  724.1  
Note: Figures relate to EU-25. Consolidated figures for EU-27 still not formally published.  
Source: WTO, 2012. 
 
 The decision to abolish production quotas from 2015 is now an EU com-
mitment. The quotas will be increased gradually to achieve a 'soft landing' for 
the EU dairy sector. Although in some EU countries, milk production quotas 
have become binding, production levels in others remain well below the availa-
ble delivery quotas.  
 Trinity College Dublin (2012a) argues that quota elimination should be re-
garded in context of the protective effect of EU tariffs. Comparing quota elimi-
nation with and without EU tariffs: with tariffs, EU dairy production increases 
while consumption of dairy products decreases more than without tariffs. Tariffs 
are not expected to change before a successful conclusion to the Doha Round, 
which is not yet in sight. The net effect could be an increase the EU milk surplus 
and lower levels of EU imports, thus depressing world market prices. However, 
this does not take into account the switch from direct payments to a single 
payment system (per ha. It is therefore estimated that for dairy, although farm-
ers' incomes will suffer, the dairy supplies will probably not be affected. It is ex-
pected that prices for milk and dairy will remain unchanged (Jongeneel et al., 
2011). 
 The OECD and FAO expect large disparity in quota fill to persist and project 
that the EU-15 quotas will be under-filled by more than 20% in 2014/15 when 
the quota regime is scheduled to end (OECD & FAO, 2012a). This is another 
reason why the quota abolition in 2015 will have a limited impact on EU milk 
supply and is not expected to have any great significance for world prices (Mat-
thews, 2011c).  
 Figure 4.2 shows that market prices of fresh milk in the US are much more 
volatile than prices of milk in the EU, which have remained rather stable over the 
past decade because of the quota system. By controlling milk production, milk 
quotas indirectly contributed to stabilising the raw milk price at a relatively high 
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level, and thereby to supporting the agricultural income of milk producers 
(Jongeneel, 2011).  
 
Figure 4.2 EU farmgate prices for milk (Euro/100kg's) and USA milk in-
dex prices (USD/cwt) 
 
NB EU-25 or EU-27 depending on year. 
Sources: DairyCo Market Information, 2012; AMS-USDA, 2012. 
 
 For skimmed milk powder, which can be more easily exported than fresh 
milk, prices in the EU are comparable to international prices during the past 
three years.  
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Figure 4.3 Prices of Skimmed Milk Powder (€/tonne) in Germany, Oce-
ania and USA 2009-2011 
 
Source: CLAL, 2012. 
 
4.2.2 Dairy exports of developing countries  
 
The ACP countries have reduced customs duties for their export to the EU, 
while the LDCs have duty and quota-free access. Dairy exports to the EU are 
very small compared to the value of total exports; shares fall below 1%, which 
means that the EU is not an attractive export destination for developing coun-
tries (Figure 4.4 and Table 4.2). For some countries (Saint Lucia, Cape Verde 
and Niger), the EU is the largest export destination. After 2014, Saint Lucia, 
Guyana and Seychelles will be excluded from the new GSP, because they are 
expected to be part of another trade arrangement with the EU. Saint Lucia and 
Guyana are currently part of the CARFORUM EPA signed with the EU. Seychelles 
is part of the Economic Partnership Agreement Market Access Regulation. Cape 
Verde will cease to be an LDC under the new GSP but has a three year transition 
period when it continues to enjoy EBA treatment. 
 Algeria's exports to the EU are extremely low. It falls into the non-LDC and 
non-ACP country category but is part of the Euromed market access arrange-
ment with the EU, which is part of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
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(EMFTA) that is being established. Changes in EU trade policies are not ex-
pected to affect its dairy exports to the EU. 
 Overall, dairy is a relatively minor export sector in these countries. Only a 
relatively small number of dairy producers and exporting companies in names 
countries may thus be vulnerable to changes in EU agricultural policies. 
 
Figure 4.4 Countries' shares of dairy exports to the EU in total agricul-
tural exports to the world (in % average value 2005-2010) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
Cut-off point is 0.10%. 
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Table 4.2 Countries' shares of dairy exports to the EU in total agricul-
tural exports to the world (in mln euro average 2005-2010) 
Country 
and re-
gion 
Export Dairy 
to EU 
Export Total 
Agriculture to 
World 
Export Dairy 
to World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
ACP  2,705   24,961,887   130,734  0.0% 0.5% 2.1% 
Saint Lu-
cia* 
 164   36,452   170  0.5% 0.5% 96.5% 
Cape 
Verde 
 33   20,889   34  0.2% 0.2% 97.1% 
Nigeria  1,107   2,031,788   12,130  0.1% 0.6% 9.1% 
ACP + 
LDC 
 1,189   7,909,751   62,878  0.0% 0.8% 1.9% 
Gambia  51   13,514   986  0.4% 7.3% 5.2% 
Niger  224   92,227   224  0.2% 0.2% 100.0% 
Togo  239   131,266   9,251  0.2% 7.0% 2.6% 
Mali  276   320,203   1,252  0.1% 0.4% 22.0% 
LDC 879 2,033,058 16,858 0.0% 0.8% 5.2% 
Yemen  866   333,170   14,624  0.3% 4.4% 5.9% 
Misc  5,360   269,105,758   2,975,145  0.0% 1.1% 0.2% 
Algeria*  140   139,324   2,964  0.1% 2.1% 4.7% 
Grand 
Total 
 10,132   302,149,697   3,341,058  0.0% 1.1% 0.3% 
Source: authors' calculations based on Comtrade data (2012). 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 0.10%. 
* signifies that a country has another market access arrangement and in 2014 will no longer be eligible for trade 
preferences under the new GSP. 
 
4.2.3 Dairy imports by developing countries 
 
Dairy imports constitute a relatively minor share of total agricultural imports of 
developing countries (Figure 4.5 with cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 2%), although in 
Cape Verde and Mauritania dairy imports constitute over 13% of total agricultur-
al imports. The share of EU dairy imports in total dairy imports is much larger 
generally, with some countries reporting shares of over 80% (see Table 4.3). 
Thus, although dairy imports from the EU are unimportant in most countries, 
viewed in the context of total agricultural imports, many countries depend on 
the EU for their dairy imports and policy changes will affect them. 
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 The EU has been criticised for exporting dairy produce to developing coun-
tries against low prices ('dumping') (Halderman and Nelson, 2005). And for un-
fairly competing with local milk and dairy production. However, Figure 4.3 
suggests that EU prices for skim milk powder, which is usually exported instead 
of fresh milk, are not much lower than prices of other major suppliers, such as 
New Zealand or the USA. 
 Slightly reduced prices (resulting from abolishing quotas but not tariffs) may 
be good news to consumers, because imports might become cheaper. Howev-
er, slightly cheaper imports may harm local dairy production, especially in the 
countries listed below in Table 4.3. An example of this criticism is a report by 
the NGO ActionAid on Bangladesh (Curtis, 2011). It claims that with the right 
support and further development of the dairy sector, dairy imports from the EU 
could have been replaced by production of Bangladeshi dairy farmers. The EU 
dairy imports into Bangladesh deter the development of a local dairy sector be-
cause they enter Bangladesh at prices competitive with domestic milk and are 
heavily marketed and branded, undercutting local producers of fresh milk and 
domestic processors of milk powder. The price of fresh milk is influenced by 
milk powder prices because milk powder is a substitute for fresh milk.1 
 The above makes clear that contrasting interests remain in many developing 
countries: consumer will benefit from cheaper EU imports, while local producers 
will be disadvantaged. Without belittling the importance of local dairy sectors in 
developing countries, in general, dairy is an insignificant sector in agricultural 
trade for most developing countries, with a few exceptions such as ACP Cape 
Verde, Gabon and Nigeria, ACP and LDC Mauritania and non ACP and LDC Alge-
ria. 
 
                                                 
1 In this light, the export subsidies that were given in 2008-09 (Figure 4.1) have also been an issue of 
heavy criticism. 
 46 
Figure 4.5 Countries' shares of dairy imports from the EU in total agri-
cultural and dairy imports from the world (in % average val-
ue 2005-2010) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
NB Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is for share in total agricultural imports is 4%. 
 
Table 4.3 Countries' shares of dairy imports from the EU in total agri-
cultural imports and total dairy imports from the world (in mln 
euro average 2005-2010) Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 2% 
Country and 
region 
Import Dairy 
from EU 
Import Total 
Agriculture 
from World 
Import 
Dairy from 
World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
ACP  592,592   21,024,752   1,380,774  2.82% 6.6% 42.9% 
Cape Verde  26,670   192,772   28,145  13.83% 14.6% 94.8% 
Gabon  8,175   97,889   9,333  8.35% 9.5% 87.6% 
Nigeria  257,325   3,920,930   452,950  6.56% 11.6% 56.8% 
Belize  4,534   80,365   10,889  5.64% 13.5% 41.6% 
Dominica  2,076   38,049   4,076  5.46% 10.7% 50.9% 
Guyana  8,224   163,470   25,907  5.03% 15.8% 31.7% 
Dominican 
Rep. 
 87,532   1,754,775   140,674  4.99% 8.0% 62.2% 
Grenada  2,666   62,372   7,597  4.27% 12.2% 35.1% 
Cameroon  12,414   354,198   16,879  3.50% 4.8% 73.5% 
Côte d'Ivoire  43,392   1,331,122   63,283  3.26% 4.8% 68.6% 
Saint Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
 2,439   78,153   6,384  3.12% 8.2% 38.2% 
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Table 4.3 Countries' shares of dairy imports from the EU in total agri-
cultural imports and total dairy imports from the world (in mln 
euro average 2005-2010) (continued) 
Country and 
region 
Import Dairy 
from EU 
Import Total 
Agriculture 
from World 
Import 
Dairy from 
World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
Ghana  24,455   879,615   56,870  2.78% 6.5% 43.0% 
Cuba  13,366   487,848   57,709  2.74% 11.8% 23.2% 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
 1,645   75,859   6,191  2.17% 8.2% 26.6% 
Barbados  6,561   308,789   22,758  2.12% 7.4% 28.8% 
Mauritius  13,333   847,633   80,879  1.57% 9.5% 16.5% 
ACP + LDC  180,661   7,116,385   381,931  2.54% 5.4% 47.3% 
Mauritania  34,151   265,660   41,234  12.86% 15.5% 82.8% 
Djibouti  1,953   32,395   3,157  6.03% 9.7% 61.9% 
Mali  17,643   318,136   24,673  5.55% 7.8% 71.5% 
Senegal  64,674   1,220,688   120,087  5.30% 9.8% 53.9% 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 
 1,326   27,697   1,680  4.79% 6.1% 78.9% 
Togo  2,469   62,185   3,233  3.97% 5.2% 76.4% 
Benin  3,182   96,740   5,382  3.29% 5.6% 59.1% 
Comoros  425   13,609   1,026  3.12% 7.5% 41.4% 
Burkina Faso  3,638   139,688   7,039  2.60% 5.0% 51.7% 
Gambia  2,523   97,199   5,964  2.60% 6.1% 42.3% 
Niger  5,577   230,155   19,267  2.42% 8.4% 28.9% 
Sudan  19,792   882,014   54,670  2.24% 6.2% 36.2% 
Malawi  3,905   240,141   10,854  1.63% 4.5% 36.0% 
LDC  66,930   4,357,387   233,392  1.54% 5.4% 28.7% 
Yemen  52,290   1,770,203   158,690  2.95% 9.0% 33.0% 
Misc  1,574,338   173,143,715   7,155,455  0.91% 4.1% 22.0% 
Algeria  493,392   6,399,325   939,319  7.71% 14.7% 52.5% 
Morocco  100,878   4,164,275   202,179  2.42% 4.9% 49.9% 
Indonesia  152,150   9,207,375   725,598  1.65% 7.9% 21.0% 
Grand Total  2,414,521   205,642,238   9,151,551  1.17% 4.5% 26.4% 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 2.0%. 
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4.3 Sugar 
 
4.3.1 EU sugar policies 
 
The EU is currently a net importer of sugar. EU sugar imports account for 7.6% 
of world sugar trade while EU sugar exports account only for 3.7% of world 
trade. Sugarbeet production in the EU accounts for a mere 0.9% of the value of 
agricultural production in the EU (European Union, 2012). The EU sugar market 
is divided into quota sugar (for human consumption) and 'out-of-quota' sugar, 
which is used for industrial use of bioethanol processing.  
 The essential features of the current EU sugar regime are support prices (a 
minimum price to growers of sugar beet, and a guaranteed price to support the 
market), production quotas to limit over-production, tariffs and quotas on im-
ports from third countries, and subsidies to export surplus production out of the 
EU (Smit et al., 2011; Informa, 2012).  
 The high level of support to EU sugar beet growers led to EU sugar prices 
that were above world market prices, which, in turn, increased sugar production 
in the EU, which was exported to the world market with subsidies. As a conse-
quence, low cost producers in developing countries faced depressed world 
prices and reduced trade opportunities. However, after reforms sugar prices in 
the EU dropped and with the rise in world sugar prices since 2009, EU prices 
are now comparable to world prices (Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6 Sugar prices 1991-2012 
 
Source: IMF, 2011. 
 
 After a WTO dispute in 2005, which found that the EU sugar regime was in 
breach of its WTO obligations, the EU sugar policy was reformed. The interven-
tion price was lowered with 36% for sugar and with 40% for sugar beets over a 
four-year period, together with a voluntary restructuring scheme, which provided 
incentives for the EU's least efficient sugar producers and sugar beet growers 
to leave the industry (Trinity College Dublin, 2012b). Producers of sugar beets 
were compensated for 65% of the price decrease. The sugar production quotas 
were decreased by around one third. Producers of sugar may now sell their 
quotas to the EU and buy part of the quotas later on (Smit et al., 2011). After 
the 2005 reforms, sugar production in the EU decreased, changing the EU from 
a net exporter to a net importer. In 2006/07 exports of white sugar dropped 
with 6.7 tonnes.  
 In September 2015, the EU sugar policy of production quota for which a 
price guarantee1 applies is expected to expire. Any surplus sugar that is pro-
duced above the production quota will be sold at world market prices. Under the 
WTO, 1.37m tonnes of subsidised sugar exports from the EU is allowed, with an 
expenditure of €513.9m (WTO, 2012) 
                                                 
1 Minimum price for sugar beet farmers and a reference price for sugar processing industry. 
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 The OECD and FAO (OECD & FAO, 2012b, 155) expect internal sugar prices 
to decline further. Additional adjustments will take place in national industries 
within the EU in response to changing prices incentives, including conversion of 
some former non-quota beet production destined for ethanol to higher value 
sugar output. Unrestricted (industrial) isoglucose production is also expected to 
increase. The OECD and FAO expect production of sugar to be 16.1 tonnes in 
2021-22 and to remain well below annual consumption (18.5 tonnes).  
 
Figure 4.7 World sugar consumption and production (left axis) and 
stock to use ration (right axis) 2005-2021 
 
Source: OECD and FAO Secretariats (OECD & FAO, 2012b). 
 
 Although EU tariffs on sugar and sugar products are sufficiently high to keep 
out third country imports, the EU has had a number of preferential agreements 
under which limited volumes of sugar are admitted. The most important is the 
Sugar Protocol under the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacif-
ic (ACP) countries, which guaranteed the EU support price for a limited quantity 
of sugar imports from these countries. Table 4.4 lists these preferential export-
ers.  
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Table 4.4 List of preferential exporters to the EU 
Part I: Least Developed Countries (LDCs)  Part II: Non LDCs  
Group Label  Third Country  Region Third Country  
NON-ACP LDC Bangladesh Central Africa Non 
LDC  
 
 Cambodia  Western Africa Non 
LDC  
Côte d'Ivoire* a) 
 Laos  SADC Non LDC  Swaziland*  
 Nepal  EAC Non LDC  Kenya*  
ACP-LDC  Benin  ESA Non LDC  Mauritius*  
 Burkina Faso  Zimbabwe* 
 Democratic Republic of Congo Pacific Non-LDC Fiji* 
 Ethiopia  Barbados* 
 Madagascar  Belize* 
 Malawi  Dominican Repub-
lic* 
 Mozambique  Guyana* 
 Senegal  Jamaica* 
 Sierra Leone  Trinidad & Tobago* 
 Sudan   
 Tanzania   
 Togo   
 Uganda   
 Zambia   
a) * refers to countries that will no longer enjoy preferential access under the new GSP because they have another 
market access arrangement with the EU. See also Table 4.5. 
 
 Unlimited access was granted to least developed countries from 2009 as 
part of the EBA agreement, while other developing countries have benefited 
from import quotas for specific amounts under other agreements. For instance, 
free access for ACP sugar under Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will 
be subject to an automatic safeguard mechanism to be applied to non-LDC 
ACPs only. Free access is granted unless two criteria are simultaneously met 
(Hönich, 2011): 
- total imports from ACPs reach 3.5m tonnes and 
- imports from ACP non-LDCs reach 1.38m t in 2008/9, 1.45m t in 2009/10 
and 1.6m t per marketing year in 2010/11-2014/15. 
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 Specific regions that have signed an EPA are affected by a regional safe-
guard threshold for exports from non-LDCs (Table 4.5). From 1 October 2015 
onwards, the access to EU market is expected to be totally free, while the EPA 
safeguards will still apply. 
 
Table 4.5 Regional Safeguard Thresholds (RSTs) (tonnes white sugar 
equivalent) 
Region Country 2009/2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 
CEMAC (Central Africa Non 
LDC)  
 10,186.1  10,186.1  10,186.1  
ECOWAS (Western Africa 
Non LDC)  
Côte d'Ivoire  10,186.1  1,186.1  10,186.1  
SADC (Southern Africa Non 
LDC)  
Swaziland  166,081.2  174,631.9  192,954.5  
EAC (East Africa Non LDC) Kenya  12,907.9  13,572.4  14,996.5  
ESA (Eastern and Southern 
Africa (ESA) Economic Part-
nership Agreements Non 
LDC ) 
Mauritius  544,711.6  572,755.9  632,850.9  
Zimbabwe    
Pacific Non LDC  Fiji  181,570.5  190,918.6  210,950.3  
CARIFORUM (Forum of the 
Caribbean Group of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
States Non LDC) 
Barbados  454,356.6  477,749.0  527,875.6  
Belize    
Dominican Re-
public 
   
Guyana    
Jamaica    
Trinidad & To-
bago 
   
Total ACP Non LDC   1,380,000  1,450,000  1,600,000  
Source: Based on Singh, 2012. 
 
 The elimination of sugar quotas may lead to an increase in sugar and isoglu-
cose production, which will lower prices. This may lead less competitive pro-
ducers to leave the market. A surge of imports from third countries is not 
expected because a reduction of import tariffs is not part of the proposed re-
form package. The lower prices in the EU will lead to the EU becoming a less in-
teresting market to export to. The trade balance of the EU for sugar is therefore 
expected to improve.  
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 Two studies reviewed by Matthews (2011c), namely Nolte et al., (2011) and 
the European Commission (2011a), project a minimal impact on world sugar 
prices, although the two studies have different scenarios for preferential im-
ports. Nonetheless, the decision of the EU to allow the export of 700.000 
tonnes of surplus (out-of-quota) sugar production in 2011 drew angry criticism 
from producers in Australia and Brazil (Informa, 2011; South Centre, 2011), 
showing how sensitive the EU sugar exports are.  
 Developing countries can produce sugar at much lower cost than the EU, 
yet reform of the EU sugar policy will result in both winners and losers in among 
them. Reform will benefit competitive sugar exporters currently excluded from 
the EU market. It will adversely affect those developing countries that currently 
benefit from preferential import access to the EU's high-priced sugar market. It 
will also diminish the benefits received by those least-developed countries to 
which duty-free and quota-free access were promised after July 2009 (ACP-LDC 
suppliers). Singh (2012) notes that in the absence of quotas, this preference 
could fall to zero as long as world prices are supported above 18- 22 cents/lb. 
However, he expects that if world prices decrease, prices in the EU will remain 
above world market values. In this way, the EU will continue to give the ACP-LDC 
some protection from the volatility of the world market. 
 
4.3.2 Sugar exports by developing countries  
 
Figure 4.8 shows the countries that are most sensitive to a change in EU policy, 
as their shares of sugar exports to the EU in total agricultural exports to the 
world are relatively large (cut-off point for (A)/(B) is > 2%). Table 4.6 lists these 
countries per category and also provides information on the share of sugar ex-
ports to the EU in total sugar exports. It shows that most countries fall into the 
ACP non-LDC category 
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Figure 4.8 Countries' shares of sugar exports to the EU in total agricul-
tural exports to the world (in % average value 2005-2010) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 2%. 
 
 Table 4.6 shows that for many countries, the EU is the main outlet for sugar, 
especially for ACP countries, with shares well over 75%. These will no longer be 
eligible for trade preferences in the new GSP. However, all, except Cuba, are 
part of the CARIFORUM EPA signed with the EU, which grants them trade pref-
erences. Cuba's sugar exports therefore, will be vulnerable to changes in trade 
preferences that apply in 2014. 
 A few LDCs countries also have high shares of sugar exports. Although sug-
ar is negligible in Cambodia's agricultural exports (1.6%), the EU is its most im-
portant export outlet (with almost 90% of sugar exports), implying that any 
policy change of the EU will immediately impact the sugar industries in these 
countries. Sugar world market prices were higher than EU prices, inducing 
many sugar exporting countries to shift part of their exports away from the EU. 
This is expected to be a temporary phenomenon, as world and EU sugar prices 
are likely to converge (Agritrade, 2011a). All countries will keep their preferen-
tial access to the EU under the new GSP. 
 Algeria is not eligible for trade preferences under a new GSP, as it is part of 
Euromed. Pakistan, however, may become eligible, which may provide opportu-
nities to increase sugar exports to the EU.  
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Table 4.6 Countries' value and shares of sugar exports to the EU in total 
agricultural and sugar exports to the world (in million USD, 
average 2005-2010) per category a) 
Country 
and region 
Export  
Sugar to EU 
Export Total Ag-
riculture to World 
Export Sugar 
to World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
ACP  717,046   22,305,844   1,462,873  3.21% 6.6% 49.0% 
Mauritius*  290,348   651,786   299,598  44.5% 46.0% 96.9% 
Guyana*  109,946   380,937   142,646  28.9% 37.4% 77.1% 
Fiji*  106,485   388,480   136,337  27.4% 35.1% 78.1% 
Barbados*  18,436   93,555   18,655  19.7% 19.9% 98.8% 
Swaziland*  78,238   411,872   82,529  19.0% 20.0% 94.8% 
Jamaica*  27,324   151,472   34,078  18.0% 22.5% 80.2% 
Belize*  46,966   359,469   108,708  13.1% 30.2% 43.2% 
Trinidad and 
Tobago* 
 10,912   309,780   19,393  3.5% 6.3% 56.3% 
Cuba** b)  4,128   145,627   27,496  2.8% 18.9% 15.0% 
ACP + LDC  108,776   6,999,267   277,264  1.55% 4.0% 39.2% 
Zambia  21,177   394,564   91,424  5.4% 23.2% 23.2% 
Malawi  37,415   747,526   58,221  5.0% 7.8% 64.3% 
Mozambique  13,765   434,666   36,543  3.2% 8.4% 37.7% 
Sudan  9,536   320,968   11,980  3.0% 3.7% 79.6% 
Benin  1,251   71,002   1,273  1.8% 1.8% 98.2% 
Madagascar  6,326   363,964   8,648  1.7% 2.4% 73.2% 
LDC  2,484   1,079,660   8,266  0.23% 0.8% 30.1% 
Cambodia  762   46,215   858  1.6% 1.9% 88.8% 
Misc  513,859   266,092,276   13,498,881  0.2% 5.1% 3.8% 
Algeria*  3,500   139,324   42,396  2.5% 30.4% 8.3% 
Pakistan***  50,293   3,064,000   116,591  1.6% 3.8% 43.1% 
Grand To-
tal 
 1,342,165   296,477,047   15,247,284  0.45% 5.1% 8.8% 
a) * signifies that a country has another market access arrangement and in 2014 will no longer be eligible for trade 
preferences under the new GSP; b) ** signifies that a country is no longer in the beneficiaries list; c) *** signifies 
that a country can apply under the so-called 'vulnerability criterion', which will be relaxed under the new GSP so 
more countries can apply.  
Source: authors' calculations based on Comtrade data (2012). Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 2%, except for LDC and 
Miscellaneous, Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 1.5%. 
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4.3.3 Sugar imports by developing countries 
 
The shares of sugar imports from the EU in total agricultural import value are 
very small; the highest is for Central African Republic with Sri Lanka with almost 
12% It is therefore to be expected that in this area, CAP or EU trade reforms will 
have little impact on these countries. Changes in EU sugar policy will thus hardly 
affect local consumers nor negatively affect producers in those countries with 
respect to sugar imports. 
 
Figure 4.9 Countries' value and shares of sugar imports from the EU in 
total agricultural imports from world (in %; average 2005-
2010) a) 
 
a) Cut-off point is 1.5%.  
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012 . 
 
 
 Tabel 4.7 shows that the EU exports sugar to various categories of coun-
tries, but that it is unimportant source for sugar imports for most developing 
countries.  
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Table 4.7 Countries' value and shares of sugar imports from the EU in 
total agricultural imports from world (in million USD, average 
2005-2010) per category 
Country 
and re-
gion 
Import Sugar 
from EU 
Import Total Agri-
culture from 
World 
Import Sugar 
from World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
Acp  90,019   21,007,082   1,016,363  0.4% 4.8% 8.9% 
Guyana  2,830   163,470   6,894  1.7% 4.2% 41.1% 
Suriname  2,334   138,819   10,731  1.7% 7.7% 21.8% 
Cameroon  5,298   354,198   22,367  1.5% 6.3% 23.7% 
ACP + 
LDC 
 108,675   22,741,967   1,318,795  0.5% 5.8% 8.2% 
Gambia  4,096   97,199   16,046  4.2% 16.5% 25.5% 
Sao Tome 
and Princi-
pe 
 948   27,697   1,655  3.4% 6.0% 57.3% 
Senegal  29,342   1,220,688   56,576  2.4% 4.6% 51.9% 
Central Af-
rican Rep. 
 602   27,376   2,092  2.2% 7.6% 28.8% 
Togo  1,264   62,185   4,395  2.0% 7.1% 28.8% 
Sudan  17,197   882,014   137,522  1.9% 15.6% 12.5% 
ldc  9,042   4,375,057   354,846  0.2% 8.1% 2.5% 
- - - - - - - 
Misc  506,401   173,143,715   5,416,661  0.3% 3.1% 9.3% 
Sri Lanka  68,614   1,560,271   219,276  4.4% 14.1% 31.3% 
Tunisia  51,151   2,016,042   152,640  2.5% 7.6% 33.5% 
Algeria  135,020   6,399,325   473,825  2.1% 7.4% 28.5% 
Mongolia  1,574   98,148   12,056  1.6% 12.3% 13.1% 
Grand 
Total 
7,035 2,597,586 61,745 0.3% 2.4% 11.4% 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 1.5%. 
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4.4 Fruit and vegetables 
 
Fruit and vegetables account for 6.5% and 8.7% respectively of the value of EU 
agricultural production (European Union, 2012). The EU is the second largest 
producer, the second largest exporter and the largest importer of fruit and veg-
etables in the world (CTA, 2011).  
 The CMO for fruit and vegetables covers all fruit and vegetables grown in the 
European Union with the exception of potatoes, wine grapes, bananas, sweet 
corn, beans and peas for fodder, and olives. Bananas are an important fruit in 
terms of export revenues for several countries but they are not included in the 
CMO for fruit and vegetables. There is a separate banana trade regime, which is 
discussed briefly below.  
 The fruit and vegetables sector has been subject to various CAP reforms in 
1996, 2001 and 2007 (Agritrade, 2011b). Price support was abandoned in fa-
vour of increased levels of direct aid to farmers. The fruit and vegetable sector 
was incorporated into the single payment scheme, although a range of sector-
specific measures implemented through producer organisations (POs) were 
maintained. In addition, certain traditional trade policy tools were maintained, 
notably minimum import price arrangements. In 2007, a single CMO was creat-
ed. The current CMO aims to make the sector more competitive and marketa-
ble, promote consumption, reduce pressure from crises, improve environmental 
safeguards and increase consumption of fruit and vegetables in the EU (Europe-
an Commission, 2012g).  
 The most important change of 2007 for the purpose of this study was to 
abolish export subsidies. However, export subsidies are still available to EU ex-
porters of certain products to third countries to compensate for the difference 
between EU and world prices. The products covered are: apples, lemons, or-
anges, peaches, nectarines, table grapes, tomatoes and some nuts. Subsidies 
are set periodically or on the basis of requests from operators and the quanti-
ties available. 
 The Common Customs Tariff rate is applicable to fruit and vegetable prod-
ucts. The objective of the tariff is to allow domestic producers to compete with 
growers exporting from other countries. Tariff quotas are dealt with on a first 
come first served basis. Different import tariffs apply for fruit and vegetables. 
Table 4.8 shows the current WTO ceilings. 
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Table 4.8 WTO ceilings on annual subsidised fruit and vegetables ex-
ports from the EU 
Product category  Quantity ('000t)  Expenditure (million €)  
Fruit and vegetables, fresh 411.6  945.8  
Fruit and vegetables, processed 323.4  298  
Source: WTO, 2012. 
 
 Fruits and vegetables are a small topic in the proposals for a reformed CAP 
(European Commission, 2012h) compared to for instance dairy or sugar. Under 
CAP reform, and against a background of increasingly market-related price for-
mation, EU support to the fruit and vegetable sector will now largely consists of: 
- policies to strengthen the position of producer organisations within the sup-
ply chain; 
- safety-net measures to ensure that increased exposure to market forces 
does not undermine the basis of production in the fruit and vegetable sector 
(CTA, 2011). 
 
 By 2011, the majority of transitional coupled support payments in the fruit 
and vegetable sector was phased out. Coupled support may be still granted to 
fruit and vegetables under certain conditions, for instance to sectors or to re-
gions of a Member State where specific types of farming or specific agricultural 
sectors undergo certain difficulties and are particularly important for economic 
and/or social and/or environmental reasons (European Commission, 2011d). 
 Public assistance in the fruit and vegetable sector now largely takes the 
form of 'support to producer organisations' (POs). While provision still exists for 
export subsidies for fruit and vegetable products, no funds were allocated under 
the 2011 budget. Support to promotional measures organised through POs now 
constitutes the main form of export-related assistance. This will be phased out 
from 2017 onwards (Table 4.9). 
 
Table 4.9  EU budget allocated to setting up aid for fruit and vegetables 
producer groups (mln Euro) 
  Changes to 2013 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total 2014-2020 
30 0 0 0 -15 -15 -30 -30 -90 
Source: European Commission, 2011e. 
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 The previous system of intervention buying to support market prices has 
been replaced by POs, within clearly defined limits. This forms part of a wider 
programme of crisis management measures.  
 A single Community F&V market implies a single trading system at the ex-
ternal frontiers of the Community. The application of Common Customs Tariff 
duties should stabilise the Community market by preventing the price level in 
non-EU countries and relative fluctuations from having repercussions on prices 
within the Community. This means avoiding supplies at extremely low prices 
from non-EU countries. This is done by fixing of reference prices and the levying 
of a countervailing charge in addition to customs duty for F&V when the entry 
price of imported products is below the reference price (Agrosynergie, 2008). 
 The entry price system for fruit and vegetables, processed fruit and vegeta-
bles and grape juice and musts is maintained (Matthews, 2011a), which guides 
a complex system of import quotas, seasonal restrictions and preferential trade 
arrangements (CTA, 2011; Agrosynergie, 2008). Nonetheless, through reforms 
and improved market access for third-country suppliers, the EU has allowed 
market prices to fall. This has potentially reduced the attractiveness of the EU 
market for undifferentiated (i.e. with no value-added) fruit and vegetable exports 
from developing countries, in particular the ACP countries (CTA, 2011). 
 The (interim) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and 'Everything But 
Arms' (EBA) arrangements have a significant impact on fruit and vegetable 
trade. These led to the removal of all seasonal and special duty restrictions, 
which formerly applied. This is beneficial to exporters from non-LDC ACP coun-
tries with (interim) EPAs, that will enjoy the same market access as LDC ACP 
exporters. Non-LDCs that are not signatories of an (interim) EPA have reverted 
back to standard Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) treatment, although 
no major ACP fruit and vegetable exporter currently falls into this category (CTA, 
2011). 
 An important factor that determines market access of fruits and vegetables 
to the EU is GlobalGAP certification (formerly EurepGAP), which was created by 
the European retail industry concerned about food safety as well as the quality 
properties of fresh food produce. The coordination of the (fresh) fruits and veg-
etables sector is increasingly based on private contracting. Developing coun-
tries thus face stricter application of food safety standards and increasingly, 
private voluntary standards.  
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4.4.1 EU banana regime 
 
Countries that belong to the ACP have enjoyed preferential access to the EU 
market for banana exports. However, after several WTO disputes and subse-
quent reforms of its banana trade regime, the EU introduced a tariff-only regime 
on 1 January 2006. When Latin American exporters outside the ACP contested 
this, the WTO decided that the EU was obliged to rebind and lower its banana 
tariff rate. In December 2009, the EU laid down a schedule for the reduction of 
the EU's tariff on bananas. Since the signing the EPA and EBA arrangements in 
January 2008, ACP banana-exporting countries continued to have duty-free, 
quota-free access to the EU market (Cali, Abbott, and Page, 2010; Trinity Col-
lege Dublin, 2010; Gilleson, Hewitt, and Page, 2005). On November 8th 2012, 
the European Union and 11 Latin American countries signed an agreement that 
ended the 20 year old dispute between the EU and the Latin American countries 
not belonging to the ACP about the EU restricting banana imports from outside 
the ACP countries. 
 The changing tariff arrangements mean that the erosion of the preferential 
margin for ACP banana-exporting countries will be faster than initially anticipat-
ed. The EU has introduced Banana Accompanying Measures (BAM) that will as-
sist ACP countries to adjust to the new banana tariffs. This applies to Belize, 
Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname, which have supplied 
more than 10,000 tonnes of bananas to the EU on average over the last ten 
years. The measures will last for a proposed maximum of four years (2010-
2013) and have a budget of €190m, with a possibility of topping up this amount 
by a further €10m (Trinity College Dublin, 2010). The mentioned countries will 
all lose preferential access to the EU in the new GSP from 2014 onwards. The 
Latin American countries fall under the Cariforum EPA with the EU. The African 
countries (Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana) will fall under the EPA Agreement 
Market Access Regulation.  
 
4.4.2 Fruit exports to the EU 
 
Figure 4.10 shows the importance of fruits and vegetable exports to the EU for 
different developing countries while Table 4.10 shows the values, placing the 
countries in the different country categories. Five non-LCD ACP countries (Saint 
Lucia, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize and South Africa) are 
in the top-seven. Banana exports account for a significant share for these Latin 
American countries (see Table 4.11 and the discussion above on the effects of 
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the EU banana regime). The Latin American countries will now enjoy the same 
market access as LDC ACP countries under the Cariforum EPA that has been 
signed, and after the dispute settlement of November 2012. South Africa South 
Africa joined the EPA negotiations as part of the Southern African Development 
Community Group (SADC) in February 2007. It has opted not to join at this 
stage as its trade relations with the EU are governed by the Trade, Development 
and Co-operation Agreement concluded with the EU in 1999. It will thus no 
longer be eligible for preferential treatment under the new GSP. 
 
Figure 4.10 Countries' shares of fruit exports to the EU in total agricul-
tural exports to the world (in % average 2005-2010) a) 
 
Cut-off point is 2%. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
 
 The importance of fruit exports to the EU of LDC ACP countries is surprising-
ly low, and therefore the erosion of preference will not affect them in a signifi-
cant way on a national level. However, Table 4.10 shows that for several 
countries, the EU is the main exporter for fruits. For example, Cameroon ex-
ports almost 100% of its fruits to Europe. The erosion of preferences will hurt 
specific fruit producers and exporters. 
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Table 4.10 Countries' value and shares of fruit exports to the EU in total 
agricultural exports to the world (in million USD, average 
2005-2010) per category 
Country and 
region 
Export Fruits 
to EU 
Export Total Agri-
culture to World 
Export Fruits 
to World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
ACP  1,311,081   22,305,844   2,355,123  5.88% 10.6% 55.7% 
Saint Lucia*a  11,352   24,301   11,673  46.7% 48.0% 97.3% 
Dominica*a  4,601   11,285   7,642  40.8% 67.7% 60.2% 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines*a 
 6,388   30,761   10,224  20.8% 33.2% 62.5% 
Belize*a  24,149   151,472   35,661  15.9% 23.5% 67.7% 
South Africa*a  884,180   5,813,136   1,535,032  15.2% 26.4% 57.6% 
Dominican Rep.*  91,332   1,105,026   125,569  8.3% 11.4% 72.7% 
Cameroon*  36,570   544,725   36,668  6.7% 6.7% 99.7% 
Côte d'Ivoire*  148,149   4,489,835   330,557  3.3% 7.4% 44.8% 
Ghana*  32,277   1,195,840   61,691  2.7% 5.2% 52.3% 
Namibia*  15,540   624,486   21,798  2.5% 3.5% 71.3% 
ACP + LDC  48,194   6,999,267   166,672  0.69% 2.4% 28.9% 
Gambia  720   11,261   1,581  6.4% 14.0% 45.5% 
Madagascar  14,149   363,964   15,556  3.9% 4.3% 91.0% 
LDC  3,513   1,079,660   153,717  0.33% 14.2% 2.3% 
- - - - - - - 
Misc  5,634,047   266,092,276   18,459,762  2.1% 6.9% 30.5% 
Panamaa  231,915   891,669   264,490  26.0% 29.7% 87.7% 
Costa Ricaa  598,046   2,814,220   1,219,703  21.3% 43.3% 49.0% 
Ecuadora  647,270   4,691,867   1,623,277  13.8% 34.6% 39.9% 
Algeria*  16,534   139,324   20,124  11.9% 14.4% 82.2% 
Morocco*  294,331   3,093,310   498,489  9.5% 16.1% 59.0% 
Colombia  459,779   5,646,592   686,966  8.1% 12.2% 66.9% 
Tunisia*  110,510   1,426,623   193,436  7.7% 13.6% 57.1% 
Chile  884,399   11,941,861   3,354,545  7.4% 28.1% 26.4% 
Egypt*  191,702   2,812,913   522,037  6.8% 18.6% 36.7% 
Bolivia  49,439   908,537   92,730  5.4% 10.2% 53.3% 
Peru  177,755   4,517,138   334,173  3.9% 7.4% 53.2% 
Honduras  17,103   789,891   141,542  2.2% 17.9% 12.1% 
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Table 4.10 Countries' value and shares of fruit exports to the EU in total 
agricultural exports to the world (in million USD, average 
2005-2010) per category (continued) 
Country and 
region 
Export Fruits 
to EU 
Export Total Agri-
culture to World 
Export Fruits 
to World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
Philippines***  66,393   3,308,580   632,045  2.0% 19.1% 10.5% 
Uruguay**  51,857   2,616,921   66,154  2.0% 2.5% 78.4% 
Grand Total  6,996,835   296,477,047   21,135,275  2.36% 7.1% 33.1% 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 2%. 
*  signifies that these countries will no longer enjoy preferential access under the new GSP because they have 
another market access arrangement with the EU. 
**  signifies that a country is no longer in the beneficiaries list. 
*** signifies that a country can apply under the so-called 'vulnerability criterion', which will be relaxed under the 
new GSP so more countries can apply. 
a Bananas constitute major share of fruit exports - see Table 4.11. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
 
 Table 4.11 shows the shares of banana exports in total agricultural exports 
for the top 8 fruit and vegetable exporters to the EU. It turns out banana exports 
account for a large share of the fruit and vegetable exports of St Lucia and 
Dominica. Banana exports are negligible for South Africa. The four remaining 
ACP countries (St Lucia, Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Belize) 
will receive additional support through the Banana Accompanying Measures 
(BAM), as they will face preference erosion in the coming years. On the other 
hand, Panama, Costa Rica and Ecuador will benefit as EU markets will open up 
for their banana exports (between 11 and 30% of their agricultural exports). 
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Table 4.11  Share of bananas in total agricultural exports of top 8 fruit 
and vegetable exporters 
Country Share F&V in total ag 
exports 
Share bananas in total 
ag exports 
ACP   
Saint Lucia*a) 47% 70% 
Dominica* 41% 48% 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines* 21% 34% 
Belize* 16% 18% 
South Africa* 15% 0% 
Misc   
Panama 26% 11% 
Costa Rica 21% 21% 
Ecuador 14% 30% 
a) * signifies that these countries will no longer enjoy preferential access under the new GSP because they have 
another market access arrangement with the EU. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012 and FAOSTAT, 2012. 
 
4.4.3 Fruit imports from the EU 
 
Figure 4.11 and Table 4.12 show that imports of fruits and vegetables from the 
EU are relatively small, and thus no large effects are to be expected from CAP 
reform for consumers in developing countries. 
 
Figure 4.11 Countries' shares of fruit imports from the EU in total agricul-
tural imports from world (in % average 2005-2010) 
 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 0.2%. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012.  
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Table 4.12 Countries' value and shares of fruit imports from the EU in to-
tal agricultural imports from world (in million USD, average 
2005-2010) per category 
Country 
and region 
Import Fruits 
from EU 
Import Total Ag-
riculture from 
World 
Import Fruits 
from World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
ACP  28,040   21,024,752   250,272  0.13% 1.2% 11.2% 
Cape Verde  5,654   192,772   6,275  2.9% 3.3% 90.1% 
Gabon  513   97,889   849  0.5% 0.9% 60.4% 
Suriname  587   138,819   1,240  0.4% 0.9% 47.4% 
South Afri-
ca 
 14,055   4,406,823   66,812  0.3% 1.5% 21.0% 
Dominica  113   38,049   212  0.3% 0.6% 53.3% 
Seychelles  369   130,773   2,644  0.3% 2.0% 14.0% 
Mauritius  1,695   847,633   19,893  0.2% 2.3% 8.5% 
ACP + 
LDC 
 6,303   7,116,385   76,495  0.09% 1.1% 8.2% 
Djibouti  780   32,395   3,045  2.4% 9.4% 25.6% 
Sao Tome 
and Princi-
pe 
 91   27,697   95  0.3% 0.3% 95.1% 
Senegal  3,351   1,220,688   22,861  0.3% 1.9% 14.7% 
Benin  224   96,740   1,772  0.2% 1.8% 12.6% 
Mauritania  472   265,660   1,329  0.2% 0.5% 35.5% 
LDC  5,244   9,304,350   221,602  0.06% 2.4% 2.4% 
Misc  5,062   4,946,963   155,970  0.1% 3.2% 3.2% 
Brazil  50,738   6,959,041   371,916  0.7% 5.3% 13.6% 
Algeria  44,363   6,399,325   151,210  0.7% 2.4% 29.3% 
Morocco  8,761   4,164,275   83,357  0.2% 2.0% 10.5% 
Argentina  2,918   1,873,793   122,949  0.2% 6.6% 2.4% 
Grand To-
tal 
 44,649   42,392,450   704,339  0.11% 1.7% 6.3% 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 0.2%. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
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4.4.4 Vegetable exports to the EU 
 
Table 4.13 shows that although the importance of vegetables exports is small 
compared to overall trade (Figure 4.12), the EU is the major export destinations 
for many developing countries, especially for African countries relatively close 
to European markets. ACP countries such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, and ACP & LDC 
countries such as Gambia, Senegal and Burundi and miscellaneous category 
countries Tunisia and Morocco all export most of their vegetables to the EU 
(around 90% or more). The new GSP will pose some changes. The ACP coun-
tries will need to obtain trade preferences under market access arrangements 
with the EU, instead of the GSP preferences.  
 The LDC countries, will continue to enjoy preferences under the new GSP, if 
they fulfil the requirements. However, they may face preferences erosion, which 
could harm the admittedly small vegetable export sector. Although the participa-
tion of smallholder farmers in vegetable exports is usually small (Minot and Ngi-
gi, 2004), producing vegetables for export can contribute to poverty reduction 
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). 
 China and Costa Rica are special cases. For Chinese vegetables, graduation 
will apply, and because China will not be able to apply to GSP+, this means Chi-
na will not be able to enjoy trade preferences for vegetables under a new GSP. 
For Costa Rican vegetables and fruits, graduation will also apply. However, Cos-
ta Rica is allowed to apply for GSP+, and if it does, graduation will not apply. 
 
Figure 4.12 Countries' shares of vegetables exports to the EU in total ag-
ricultural exports to the world (in % average 2005-2010) 
 
Cut-off point is 2%. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
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Table 4.13 Countries' shares of vegetables exports to the EU in total 
vegetables and agricultural export to the world (in % average 
2005-2010) 
Country and 
region 
Export Vegeta-
bles to EU 
Export Total 
Agriculture to 
World 
Export Vege-
tables to 
World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
ACP 17,409 886,325 21589 2.0% 80.6% 80.60% 
Zimbabwe* 99,114 906,396 107,137 10.90% 92.50% 92.50% 
Kenya* 212,412 2,346,256 238,453 9.10% 89.10% 89.10% 
Dominica* 896 13,542 1,969 6.60% 45.50% 45.50% 
ACP + LDC 6,095 349,963 21,532 10.70% 28.30% 28.30% 
Gambia 758 13,514 799 5.60% 94.80% 94.80% 
Zambia 17,080 394,564 22,338 4.30% 76.50% 76.50% 
Senegal 18,974 540,864 19,331 3.50% 98.20% 98.20% 
Madagascar 7,610 363,964 11,326 2.10% 67.20% 67.20% 
Ethiopia 23,720 1,229,579 188,065 1.90% 12.60% 12.60% 
United Rep. 
of Tanzania 
4,905 964,411 60,950 0.50% 8.00% 8.00% 
Uganda 3,248 805,360 15,402 0.40% 21.10% 21.10% 
Malawi 2,322 747,526 17,322 0.30% 13.40% 13.40% 
Burkina Faso 736 342,253 5,162 0.20% 14.30% 14.30% 
Burundi 63 81,385 70 0.10% 90.00% 89.60% 
LDC 6,136 323,898 20,493 1.90% 29.90% 29.90% 
Bangladesh 27,527 960,664 54,244 2.90% 50.70% 50.70% 
Nepal 1,527 218,310 65,603 0.70% 2.30% 2.30% 
Misc 67,049 9,175,596 435,163 0.70% 15.40% 15.40% 
Morocco* 411,301 3,093,310 449,869 13.30% 91.40% 91.40% 
Egypt* 217,435 2,812,913 503,759 7.70% 43.20% 43.20% 
Peru 111,026 4,517,138 361,302 2.50% 30.70% 30.70% 
Tunisia* 27,306 1,426,623 31,635 1.90% 86.30% 86.30% 
China**** 574,342 38,578,862 4,560,357 1.50% 12.60% 12.60% 
Panama 9,456 891,669 23,555 1.10% 40.10% 40.10% 
Algeria* 1,111 139,324 6,416 0.80% 17.30% 17.30% 
Costa Ri-
ca**** 
16,588 2,814,220 99,118 0.60% 16.70% 16.70% 
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Table 4.13 Countries' shares of vegetables exports to the EU in total 
vegetables and agricultural export to the world (in % average 
2005-2010) (continued) 
Country and 
region 
Export Vegeta-
bles to EU 
Export Total 
Agriculture to 
World 
Export Vege-
tables to 
World 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
(A) (B) (C) 
Argentina** 134,355 28,347,325 418,778 0.50% 32.10% 32.10% 
Bolivia 4,270 908,537 26,693 0.50% 16.00% 16.00% 
Ecuador 25,105 4,691,867 78,667 0.50% 31.90% 31.90% 
India 77,861 16,638,171 703,907 0.50% 11.10% 11.10% 
Occ. Palestin-
ian Terr. 
532 109,653 7,648 0.50% 7.00% 7.00% 
Grand Total 36,507 3,825,510 183,400 10.00% 19.90% 19.90% 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 2%, but lower for countries with a high share in vegetables exports. 
* signifies that a country has another market access arrangement and in 2014 will no longer be eligible for trade 
preferences under the new GSP. 
** signifies that a country is no longer in the beneficiaries list. 
*** signifies that a country can apply under the so-called 'vulnerability criterion', which will be relaxed under the 
new GSP so more countries can apply. 
**** Signifies that graduation applies for vegetables, except when a country applies for GSP+. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
 
4.4.5 Vegetable imports from the EU 
 
Figure 4.13 and Table 4.14 show that imports of vegetables from the EU are 
relatively unimportant for most developing countries. However, the EU is an im-
portant source for vegetables for certain developing countries, especially for 
ACP and LDC countries Sao Tome and Principe, Gambia, Senegal, Guinea, and 
ACP countries Cape Verde and Côte d'Ivoire (who import around 80% and more 
from the EU). For non-ACP LDCs, import of European vegetables is negligible.  
 It is not clear how they will be affected by proposed EU CAP policy changes. 
The support of the vegetables farmers through the CAP is indirect. The EU has 
allowed prices to fall, and this will benefit consumers in importing developing 
countries, but will disadvantage local producers. Trade policies will have a larg-
er impact. Under the EBAs, the EU stipulates free access to developing coun-
tries, which again will disadvantage local producers. 
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Figure 4.13 Countries' shares of vegetables imports from the EU in total 
agricultural imports to the world (in % average 2005-2010) 
 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 2%. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
 
Table 4.14 Countries' shares of vegetables imports from the EU in total 
vegetables and agricultural import to the world (in % average 
2005-2010) 
Country and 
region 
Import Vege-
tables from 
EU 
(A) 
Import Total Ag-
riculture from 
World 
(B) 
Import Vege-
tables from 
World 
(C) 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
ACP  84,481   21,024,752   507,691  0.40% 2.4% 16.6% 
Cape Verde  8,468   192,772   11,088  4.4% 5.8% 76.4% 
Suriname  3,740   138,819   5,964  2.7% 4.3% 62.7% 
Côte d'Ivoire  28,659   1,331,122   34,654  2.2% 2.6% 82.7% 
Guyana  3,280   163,470   11,424  2.0% 7.0% 28.7% 
Grenada  766   62,372   1,961  1.2% 3.1% 39.1% 
Dominica  441   38,049   1,039  1.2% 2.7% 42.5% 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 6,430   614,434   30,792  1.0% 5.0% 20.9% 
Gabon  871   97,889   1,363  0.9% 1.4% 63.9% 
Cuba  4,275   487,848   35,477  0.9% 7.3% 12.0% 
Seychelles  1,107   130,773   4,256  0.8% 3.3% 26.0% 
Barbados  2,290   308,789   11,842  0.7% 3.8% 19.3% 
Saint Vincent 
and the Gren-
adines 
 511   78,153   2,145  0.7% 2.7% 23.8% 
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Table 4.14 Countries' shares of vegetables imports from the EU in total 
vegetables and agricultural import to the world (in % average 
2005-2010) (continued) 
Country and 
region 
Import Vege-
tables from 
EU 
(A) 
Import Total Ag-
riculture from 
World 
(B) 
Import Vege-
tables from 
World 
(C) 
(A)/(B) (C)/(B) (A)/(C) 
Saint Lucia  529   88,559   4,199  0.6% 4.7% 12.6% 
Jamaica  5,355   1,014,676   22,365  0.5% 2.2% 23.9% 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
 180   35,390   1,855  0.5% 5.2% 9.7% 
Cape Verde  8,468   192,772   11,088  4.4% 5.8% 76.4% 
Suriname  3,740   138,819   5,964  2.7% 4.3% 62.7% 
Côte d'Ivoire  28,659   1,331,122   34,654  2.2% 2.6% 82.7% 
Guyana  3,280   163,470   11,424  2.0% 7.0% 28.7% 
ACP + LDC 3,351 338,875 8,118 1.00% 2.40% 41.30% 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
 964   27,697   1,029  3.5% 3.7% 93.7% 
Gambia  2,834   97,199   3,297  2.9% 3.4% 86.0% 
Senegal  28,995   1,220,688   35,686  2.4% 2.9% 81.2% 
Mauritania  4,835   265,660   7,604  1.8% 2.9% 63.6% 
Guinea  2,272   167,818   2,770  1.4% 1.7% 82.0% 
Djibouti  298   32,395   587  0.9% 1.8% 50.7% 
Sudan  7,870   882,014   34,612  0.9% 3.9% 22.7% 
Ethiopia  4,680   787,475   31,262  0.6% 4.0% 15.0% 
Togo  363   62,185   549  0.6% 0.9% 66.2% 
Mali  1,630   318,136   3,836  0.5% 1.2% 42.5% 
Uganda  2,529   493,926   8,317  0.5% 1.7% 30.4% 
LDC  4,745   4,357,387   160,939  0.11% 3.7% 2.9% 
Misc  389,487   173,143,715   5,004,736  0.2% 2.9% 7.8% 
Egypt  161,383   7,751,575   293,804  2.1% 3.8% 54.9% 
Algeria  88,033   6,399,325   241,614  1.4% 3.8% 36.4% 
Tunisia  25,064   2,016,042   37,531  1.2% 1.9% 66.8% 
Egypt  161,383   7,751,575   293,804  2.1% 3.8% 54.9% 
Grand Total  540,144   205,642,238   5,843,844  0.26% 2.8% 9.2% 
Cut-off point for (A)/(B) is 0.5% to show relevance of (A)/(C). 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
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4.5 The role of China 
 
Within the context of trade with the EU, the role of other large trading partners 
is important, in particular China, whose influence in the Asian region and Africa 
is growing. For the crops relevant to our study, Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 
show the importance of imports and exports from and to China. The imports by 
LDCs of fruits and vegetables from China are much more important than those 
from the EU. With respect to exports, China has a strong interest in expanding 
its access to international markets for its labor-intensive agricultural products. 
Particularly for perishable products such as fruits and vegetables, many of the 
logical markets are in East Asia (Bhattasali et al., 2004).  
 The export to China of fruits and vegetables, and to some degree sugar, are 
comparable to the EU. Dairy trade flows with China are insignificant compared 
to those with the EU. Finally, trade flows between ACP countries and the EU are 
much larger than with China, which can be explained by the preferential status.  
 
Figure 4.14 Imports by developing countries of vegetables, fruits, sugar 
and dairy from China and EU (% of world imports); average 
2005-2010 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
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Figure 4.15 Exports by developing countries to China and EU of vegeta-
bles, fruits, sugar and dairy (% of world imports); average 
2005-2010 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
 
 Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 show that China's trade with the world has in-
creased significantly over the past five year. This is consistent for fruits, vege-
tables, sugar and dairy. Only the export of dairy plummeted in 2008, which can 
probably be explained by the contamination of milk with melamine. Also in 2010 
and 2012 contamination was reported, which may result in Chinese dairy ex-
ports remaining at lower levels. 
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Figure 4.16 World imports from China 1995-2011 of vegetables, fruits, 
sugar and dairy (index 2005=100) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
 
Figure 4.17 World exports to China 1995-2011 of vegetables, fruits, 
sugar and dairy (index 2005=100) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Comtrade data, 2012. 
 
 The combined picture that emerges is that although China still lags behind 
the EU as a trading partner, it is becoming an increasingly important trading 
partner, especially for LDCs. In particular for vegetables, it may soon overtake 
the EU. 
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 China's trade policy has changed since its accession to the WTO in 2001. 
Bhattasali et al., (2004, 5) describe that 'agricultural trade in China has been in-
fluenced by a bewildering array of policies on imports and exports, including 
state trading, designated trading, quotas, licenses, tariffs, and tariff-rate quo-
tas.' After WTO accession, many tariffs were reduced. China now has 1,097 tar-
iff lines at the HS eight-digit level for agriculture products (WTO definition) with 
an average tariff of 15.1%, compared with 8.6% for all other products. Applied 
tariffs vary a lot from one product category to another. Most concern cereals, 
but also tariffs on sugars are high: varying from 8% to 50%. It has abolished all 
tariff quotas except for wheat, maize, rice, sugar, wool, and cotton1 (WTO Sec-
retariat, 2012). China's accession to the WTO with relatively low tariff bindings 
on agricultural products has probably led to increased prices. Given China's 
size, it plays an important role in world agricultural markets. Reduced tariffs 
lead to lower domestic prices and might thus lead to higher Chinese demand in 
world markets (Bhattasali et al., 2004).  
 China does not provide export subsidies for agricultural products2. The VAT 
rebate rate on exports of most agricultural products is currently 5% compared 
with the statutory rate of 13%. In December 2007 the rebate was removed en-
tirely for a number of products, including cereals, soybeans, and their flours and 
vegetable oils (WTO Secretariat, 2012). 
 China increasingly has supported its agricultural sector over the past ten 
years in both the Green Box (€73.8 billion3 in 2008) and the Amber Box (€11 
billion)4. Support in the Amber Box concerned mostly non-crop specific support 
as well as support for cereals (wheat, maize, rice), oilcrops (soybeans and 
rapeseed), cotton and pork (WTO Secretariat, 2012). This will have contributed 
to raising Chinese production and thus tempering price increases. 
                                                 
1 State-trading enterprises continue to dominate access to tariff quotas for these crops. State-trading 
enterprises are also the ones who export rice, maize, cotton, and tobacco, which, along with other 
grains, are subject to export quotas. 
2 However, export taxes were applied to grains from the beginning of 2008 when world grain prices 
rose, which were phased out from December 2008 to June 2009. 
3 €1 = ¥8.03 at 2012 exchange rate. 
4 According to the most recent notification on domestic support to the Committee on Agriculture in 
October 2011 for the calendar years 2005-08. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
 
The general conclusion of this report is that the impact of the current Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its upcoming reform on developing countries is lim-
ited, as compared to the impact of European trade policies. The price impact of 
CAP reform will be moderate, mainly because world market prices since 2008 
have become more aligned with EU prices.  
 The most important effects of CAP reform on developing countries are 
through changes in: 
- Direct payments: these will remain and remain large. However, the impact 
on developing countries via international price changes is small. The Euro-
pean Commission (European Commission, 2011f) has calculated that the 
implementation of the greening measures (ecological set aside and crop di-
versification) has an effect on agricultural markets: ecological set aside 
forces farmers to reduce production, which leads to a drop of supply and an 
increase of prices. Crops diversification may induce price decreases for 
crops that are introduced by farmers to substitute the main crops. The price 
effect of crop diversification, however, is limited because overall the total 
cultivated area is not changed.  
- Intervention prices: these have mostly been abolished and those that remain 
are very low. Therefore it is unlikely they will have an impact on production 
and price levels in the EU, and therefore on developing countries. 
- Milk and sugar quotas: the impact of the abolition of milk production quotas 
will be low, but the abolition of sugar quotas could result in higher EU pro-
duction, resulting in lower preferential imports from developing countries. 
- Coupled payments: these have been abolished for dairy, sugar and fruits 
and vegetables.  
- Export subsidies: these have mostly been abolished, although the EU has 
used them for dairy when prices were low. The EU still has the option to re-
introduce export subsidies, which are trade distorting. Completely abolishing 
these trade distorting subsidies could lead to a decrease in EU production 
and an increase in world market prices, but impacts are expected to be very 
limited. 
 
 The impact for developing countries will be felt more in terms of trade ac-
cess and global competition when the EU changes its trade policies, e.g. under 
the new scheme of trade preferences (GSP), the EPAs and possibly the Doha 
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Development Agenda, if successful. To what extent the new GSP will affect 
trade of developing countries is yet unclear, as it depends on whether countries 
will apply for the new GSP or GSP+, and also on whether countries will conclude 
EPA agreements, which are supposed to replace GSP in some cases. Develop-
ing countries with continued preferential access to the EU market (LDC and ACP 
countries) are increasingly faced with an erosion of these preferences, due to 
changes in both agricultural and trade policies.  
 The effect of CAP reforms on dairy is negligible in a national context: the 
share of exports of dairy products to and imports of dairy from the EU com-
pared to total agricultural trade values are relatively minor. However, the EU 
remains the most important source of dairy imports for many countries. The 
share of EU dairy imports in total dairy imports is much larger generally, with 
some countries reporting shares of over 80%. When the EU reinstates export 
subsidies for dairy, this will lead to cheaper imports of dairy for developing 
countries, benefiting consumers but possibly harming local dairy producers. The 
most vulnerable countries with respect to EU dairy imports are Cape Verde, Ga-
bon and Nigeria (ACP), Mauritania (ACP and LDC ) and Algeria. Agricultural trade 
policies are in general not relevant for the dairy sector of developing countries. 
 Sugar exports to the EU are important for a few specific ACP countries. The 
most vulnerable is Mauritius, whose sugar exports to the EU make up 45% of 
total agricultural export value and almost 100% of its total sugar exports. But 
also other major exports such as Guyana (29%) and Fiji (27%) are sensitive, as 
is Barbados, whose sugar exports to the EU constitute only 20%, but whose on-
ly outlet is the EU. These countries will possibly be affected by the new GSP 
system. 
 The shares of sugar imports from the EU in total agricultural import value 
are very small: the highest is for Sri Lanka with 6%. It is therefore to be ex-
pected that CAP or EU trade reforms will have little impact on these countries. 
The EU is no major source of sugar for any country. 
 For fruit exports, five non-LCD ACP countries (Saint Lucia, Dominica, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize and South Africa) are in the top-five of coun-
tries with a high share of fruits and vegetables exports to the EU in total agricul-
tural export value (over 15%). Banana exports account for a significant share for 
the Latin American countries. The EU is an important outlet for fruits (for Saint 
Lucia almost 100%). The importance of fruit exports to the EU of LDC ACP 
countries is surprisingly low, and thus the erosion of preferences will not affect 
them in a significant way. The reason for the relative unimportance of fruit ex-
ports to the EU may be because the EU market is complex, characterised by 
multiple regulations and high quality assurance standards. The share of fruit im-
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ports from the EU in total agricultural imports value of developing countries is 
relatively small, and thus no large effects are to be expected from CAP reform. 
 For vegetable exports, ACP countries Kenya and Zimbabwe are relatively 
vulnerable to preference erosion. They will no longer be eligible for the new 
GSP. Although vegetable exports to the EU account only 11% for Zimbabwe and 
9% for Kenya of total agricultural exports, the EU is the main market for vegeta-
bles (92% and 89% respectively). Morocco's vegetable exports to the EU ac-
count for 13% of total agricultural exports, with the EU being the main market. 
Morocco is a non-LDC and non-ACP country, but is part of the EuroMed. It has 
little to lose from preference erosion because it is a competitive supplier. Vege-
table imports from the EU are very small and therefore no impact from either 
the CAP or agricultural trade policy is expected. 
 Our analysis has specified, which countries are vulnerable to changes in the 
CAP or EU agricultural trade policies for dairy, sugar and fruits and vegetables. 
More detailed case-studies are needed that take into account the market struc-
ture of these countries to be able to pin-point exactly how these countries will 
be affected. Our study provides a basis for selecting these case-studies. Over-
all, it is clear that any change in CAP and trade policies will affect some group, 
either domestic consumers or domestic producers and thus some harm cannot 
be avoided. The principle of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) could be 
used to compensate these groups in the short term.  
 Finally, China is becoming an increasingly important trade partner to devel-
oping countries, especially during the past five years. Although for most devel-
oping countries, and especially the ACP and LDC countries, the EU is still by far 
a more important trade partner than China, for many other developing coun-
tries, China has already become equally important, and specifically for vegeta-
bles. 
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Appendix 1 
List of ACP countries and information on participation in 
EPAs 
 
 
Table A1.1 ACP countries in Africa 
Africa 
The African ACP countries negotiate in five Economic Partnership Agreements groups 
SADC group 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Angola 
Botswana 
EAC group 
Burundi 
Rwanda 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Eastern and Southern Africa group (COMESA related) 
Malawi 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Seychelles 
Comoros 
Madagascar 
Mauritius 
Djibouti 
Ethiopia 
Eritrea 
Sudan 
Somalia, not participating in EPA 
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Table A1.1 ACP countries in Africa (continued) 
CEMAC plus São Tomé and Príncipe, DR Congo group (ECCAS related) 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Republic of the Congo 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Gabon 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
West Africa group (ECOWAS plus Mauritania) 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Ivory Coast 
Togo 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Mali 
Mauritania 
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Table A1.2 ACP countries in the Caribbean 
Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Cuba, not participating in EPA 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
All countries of the Caribbean Community plus Dominican Republic group nego-
tiate in the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the Euro-
pean Union (EU). The related EU Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) are: 
Aruba, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Anguilla, Cayman Is-
lands, Turks and Caicos Islands, Montserrat and the related EU outermost re-
gions are Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Saint Martin, Saint 
Barthélemy. 
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Table A1.3 ACP countries in the Pacific 
Pacific 
Cook Islands 
Timor-Leste, not participating in EPA 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Federated States of Micronesia 
Nauru 
Niue 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Samoa 
Solomon Islands 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
 
 All countries of the Pacific Islands Forum group negotiate in the Pacific EPA 
with the EU. The related EU OCTs are: New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French 
Polynesia, Pitcairn islands. 
 In the North Atlantic region EU OCTs of Greenland and Saint Pierre and Mi-
quelon are located, but no ACP countries. In the South Atlantic region the EU 
OCTs of Saint Helena and Falkland Islands are located, but no ACP countries. 
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Appendix 2 
List of LDC countries 
 
 
Table A2.1 List of 'least developed countries' according to the United Na-
tions 
Africa (33 countries) 
Angola 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Rwanda 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
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Table A2.1 List of 'least developed countries' according to the United Na-
tions (continued) 
Africa (33 countries) 
Sudan 
Togo 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Asia-Pacific (14 countries) 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Cambodia 
East Timor 
Kiribati 
Laos 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Samoa 
Solomon Islands 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Yemen 
Americas (1 country) 
Haiti 
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Appendix 3 
EU export subsidies for sugar, dairy and fruits and 
vegetables 2003-2009 
 
 
Table A3.1 Export subsidies 2008-2009 
Product Total 
exports  
('000 t) 
Subsidised exports Annual commitment  
levels 
Outlays 
(million €) 
Quantity ('000 t) Outlays 
(million €) 
Quantity 
('000 t) 
Sugar  2093.4 0.0 950.01 513.9 1374.4 
Butter and butteroil 149.8 54.3 98.1 945.8 411.6 
Skim milk powder 177.5 25.8 126.5 298.0 323.4 
Cheese  548.1 24.7 134.0 345.7 331.7 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, fresh 
2347.6 0.0 0.0 108.7 1173.3 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, processed 
425.4 0.0 0.0 141.3 378.5 
 
Table A3.2 Export subsidies 2007-2008 
Product Total 
exports  
('000 t) 
Subsidised exports Annual commitment  
levels 
Outlays  
(million €) 
Quantity ('000 t) Outlays  
(million €) 
Quantity 
('000 t) 
Sugar  2419.8 441.3 1359.6 513.9 1374.4 
Butter and butteroil 131.1 0.0 0.0 945.8 411.6 
Skim milk powder 195.2 0.0 0.0 298.0 323.4 
Cheese  567.1 0.0 0.0 345.7 331.7 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, fresh 
1871.3 4.4 167.1 108.7 1173.3 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, processed 
446.7 2.4 58.0 141.3 378.5 
 
                                                 
1 These exports did not attract any export subsidies. 
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Table A3.3 Export subsidies 2006-2007 
Product Total  
exports  
('000 t) 
Subsidised exports Annual commitment  
levels 
Outlays  
(million €) 
Quantity ('000 t) Outlays  
(million €) 
Quantity 
('000 t) 
Sugar  2371.4 470.1 1336.9 513.9 1374.4 
Butter and butteroil 257.2 239.2 253.8 945.8 411.6 
Skim milk powder 130.1 0.0 0.0 298.0 323.4 
Cheese  605.7 108.8 292.5 345.7 331.7 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, fresh 
2173.2 14.5 451.1 108.7 1173.3 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, processed 
424.0 4.4 93.6 141.3 378.5 
 
Table A3.4 Export subsidies 2005-2006 
Product Total  
exports 
('000 t) 
Subsidised exports Annual commitment  
levels 
Outlays 
(million €) 
Quantity ('000 t) Outlays  
(million €) 
Quantity 
('000 t) 
Sugar  8360.6 442.8 1215.0 499.1 1273.5 
Butter and butteroil 245.8 292.3 295.4 947.8 399.3 
Skim milk powder 133.9 14.6 117.0 275.8 272.5 
Cheese  542.7 142.6 319.4 341.7 321.3 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, fresh 
1895.7 20.2 519.6 52.8 753.4 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, processed 
393.7 3.9 84.0 8.3 143.3 
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Table A3.5 Export subsidies 2004-2005 
Product Total 
exports 
('000 t) 
Subsidised exports Annual commitment  
levels 
Outlays  
(million €) 
Quantity ('000 t) Outlays 
(million €) 
Quantity 
('000 t) 
Sugar  6349.1 466.9 1130.3 499.1 1273.5 
Butter and butteroil 360.5 519.2 381.5 947.8 399.3 
Skim milk powder 220.1 66.0 212.2 275.8 272.5 
Cheese  513.6 157.1 299.7 341.7 321.3 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, fresh 
1578.1 13.4 423.1 52.8 753.4 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, processed 
369.7 3.6 78.0 8.3 143.3 
 
Table A3.6 Export subsidies 2003-2004 
Product Total ex-
ports 
('000 t) 
Subsidised exports Annual commitment  
levels 
Outlays 
(million €) 
Quantity ('000 t) Outlays  
(million €) 
Quantity 
('000 t) 
Sugar  3,861.7 325.9 663.2 499.1 1,273.5 
Butter and butte-
roil 
324.9 618.4 353.5 947.8 399.3 
Skim milk powder 244.4 143.2 258.9 275.8 272.5 
Cheese  487.1 239.1 321.2 341.7 321.3 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, fresh 
1,686.2 15.7 694.2 52.8 753.4 
Fruit and vegeta-
bles, processed 
349.3 3.9 84.0 8.3 143.3 
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Appendix 4 
List of agricultural graduated sectors for the period 
1 January 2014 - 31 December 2016 
 
 
  Section Description 
China P.R.  
  S-1a Live animals and animal products excluded fish 
  S-1b Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates 
  S-2b Vegetables and fruit 
  S-2c Coffee, tea, maté and spices 
  S-2d Cereals, flour, nuts, resins and vegetable plaiting 
  S-4b Prepared foodstuffs (excl. meat and fish), beverages, spirits and vinegar 
Costa Rica  
   S-2b Vegetables and fruit 
Ecuador  
  S-2a Live plants and floricultural products 
  S-4a Preparations of meat and fish 
Indonesia  
   S-1a Live animals and animal products excluded fish 
  S-3 Animal or vegetable oils, fats and waxes 
Thailand  
  S-4a Preparations of meat and fish 
  S-4b Prepared foodstuffs (excl. meat and fish), beverages, spirits and vinegar 
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Appendix 5 
List of beneficiaries under the new GSP 
 
 
1. EBA (49 partners):  
Forty-nine countries continue to receive Everything But Arms (EBA) treatment 
(duty-free quota-free access except for arms). These are LDCs (see note below). 
 
Africa: Asia: 
1. Angola 34.Afghanistan 
2. Benin 35.Bangladesh 
3. Burkina Faso 36.Bhutan 
4. Burundi 37.Cambodia 
5. Central African Republic 38.Lao PDR 
6. Chad 39.Maldives 
7. Comoros 40.Myanmar/Burma  
8. Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 41.Nepal 
9. Djibouti 42.Timor-Leste 
10.Equatorial Guinea 43.Yemen 
11.Eritrea   
12.Ethiopia Australia and Pacific: 
13.Gambia 44.Kiribati 
14.Guinea 45.Samoa 
15.Guinea-Bissau 46.Solomon Islands 
16.Lesotho 47.Tuvalu 
17.Liberia 48.Vanuatu 
18.Madagascar   
19.Malawi Caribbean: 
20.Mali 49.Haiti 
21.Mauritania   
22.Mozambique   
23.Niger   
24.Rwanda   
25.Sao Tome and Principe   
26.Senegal   
27.Sierra Leone   
 101 
28.Somalia   
29.Sudan   
30.Tanzania   
31.Togo   
32.Uganda   
33.Zambia   
Notes: Myanmar/Burma's preferences are withdrawn since 1997 due to serious and systematic violations of prin-
ciples of core international labour conventions. The Commission proposed in September 2012 its reinstatement in-
to EBA. At the time of release of this document, the European Parliament and Council were considering the 
Commission proposal. The Maldives has ceased to be an LDC and has a transitional period where it can benefit 
from EBA until end 2013.  
 
2. GSP beneficiaries (40):  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, China (people's Republic of), Cape Verde, Colom-
bia, Congo (Republic of), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatema-
la, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kirghizia, Marshall 
(islands), Micronesia (federate States of), Mongolia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Niue, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, 
Syrian (Arab Republic), Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam.  
 
3. GSP+ 
Initially, the GSP+ beneficiary list is empty, as all eligible countries must apply 
for new GSP+ benefits, including those countries which benefit from GSP+ to-
day. All GSP beneficiaries with the exception of China, Colombia India, Indone-
sia, Thailand and Vietnam are considered vulnerable and thus are eligible to 
apply for GSP+. 
(European Commission, 2012k) 
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Appendix 6 
List of countries according to LDC status, ACP and 
income group 
 
 
Currently, the following criteria are used to classify countries as least devel-
oped: 
1. Gross national income per capita 
2. Human Asset Index 
3. Economic Vulnerability Index 
 
 In addition, low income countries with population larger than 75m inhabitants 
are not eligible to be considered for inclusion (United Nations, 2008).  
 The World bank divides economies according to 2011 GNI per capita, calcu-
lated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $1,025 
or less; lower middle income, $1,026 - $4,035; upper middle income, $4,036 - 
$12,475; and high income, $12,476 or more (World Bank, 2013a). 
 
Country LDC ACP Low-
income 
economies 
($1,025 
or less) 
Lower-
middle-
income 
economies 
($1,026 to 
$4,035) 
Upper-middle-
income economies 
($4,036 to 
$12,475) 
ACP & LDC 
Angola 1 1     1 
Benin 1 1 1     
Burkina Faso 1 1 1     
Burundi 1 1 1     
Central African Republic 1 1 1     
Chad 1 1 1     
Comoros 1 1 1     
Congo, Dem. Rep 1 1 1 1   
Equatorial Guinea 1 1     High-Income Economy 
Eritrea 1 1 1     
Ethiopia 1 1 1     
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Country LDC ACP Low-
income 
economies 
($1,025 
or less) 
Lower-
middle-
income 
economies 
($1,026 to 
$4,035) 
Upper-middle-
income economies 
($4,036 to 
$12,475) 
Gambia 1 1 1     
Guinea 1 1 1     
Guinea-Bissau 1 1 1     
Haiti 1 1 1     
Kiribati 1 1   1   
Lesotho 1 1   1   
Liberia 1 1 1     
Madagascar 1 1 1     
Malawi 1 1 1     
Mali 1 1 1     
Mauritania 1 1 1     
Mozambique 1 1 1     
Niger 1 1 1     
Rwanda 1 1 1     
Samoa 1 1   1   
São Tomé and Principe 1 1   1   
Senegal 1 1   1   
Sierra Leone 1 1 1     
Solomon Islands 1 1   1   
Somalia 1 1 1     
Sudan 1 1   1   
Tanzania 1 1 1     
Timor-Leste 1 1   1   
Togo 1 1 1     
Tuvalu 1 1     1 
Uganda 1 1 1     
Vanuatu 1 1   1   
Zambia 1 1   1   
LDC 
Djibouti  1         
Afghanistan 1   1     
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Country LDC ACP Low-
income 
economies 
($1,025 
or less) 
Lower-
middle-
income 
economies 
($1,026 to 
$4,035) 
Upper-middle-
income economies 
($4,036 to 
$12,475) 
Bangladesh 1   1     
Bhutan 1     1   
Cambodia 1   1     
Lao People's Democratic Rep. 1     1   
Myanmar 1   1     
Nepal 1   1     
Yemen 1     1   
ACP 
Antigua and Barbuda   1     1 
Bahamas   1       
Barbados   1       
Belize   1   1   
Botswana   1     1 
Cameroon   1   1   
Cape Verde   1   1   
Congo, Rep.   1   1   
Cook Islands   1       
Cuba   1     1 
Djibouti   1   1   
Dominica   1     1 
Dominican Republic   1     1 
Federated States of Micronesia   1       
Fiji   1   1   
Gabon   1     1 
Ghana   1   1   
Grenada   1     1 
Guyana   1   1   
Ivory Coast   1       
Jamaica   1     1 
Kenya   1 1     
Marshall Islands   1   1   
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Country LDC ACP Low-
income 
economies 
($1,025 
or less) 
Lower-
middle-
income 
economies 
($1,026 to 
$4,035) 
Upper-middle-
income economies 
($4,036 to 
$12,475) 
Mauritius   1     1 
Namibia   1     1 
Nauru   1       
Nigeria   1   1   
Niue   1       
Palau   1     1 
Papua New Guinea   1   1   
Saint Kitts and Nevis   1       
Saint Lucia   1     1 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   1     1 
Seychelles   1     1 
South Africa   1     1 
Suriname   1     1 
Swaziland   1   1   
Tonga   1   1   
Trinidad and Tobago    1       
Zimbabwe   1 1     
Low income 
Korea, Dem Rep.     1     
Kyrgyz Republic     1     
Tajikistan     1     
Lower-middle income 
Albania       1   
Armenia       1   
Bolivia       1   
Côte d'Ivoire       1   
Egypt, Arab Rep.       1   
El Salvador       1   
Georgia       1   
Guatemala       1   
Honduras       1   
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Country LDC ACP Low-
income 
economies 
($1,025 
or less) 
Lower-
middle-
income 
economies 
($1,026 to 
$4,035) 
Upper-middle-
income economies 
($4,036 to 
$12,475) 
India       1   
Indonesia       1   
Iraq       1   
Kosovo        1   
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.       1   
Moldova       1   
Mongolia       1   
Morocco       1   
Nicaragua       1   
Pakistan        1   
Paraguay       1   
Philippines       1   
South Sudan       1   
Sri Lanka       1   
Syrian Arab Republic       1   
Ukraine       1   
Uzbekistan       1   
Vietnam       1   
West Bank and Gaza       1   
Upper-middle income 
Algeria         1 
American Samoa         1 
Argentina         1 
Azerbaijan         1 
Belarus         1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina         1 
Brazil         1 
Bulgaria         1 
Chile         1 
China         1 
Colombia         1 
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Country LDC ACP Low-
income 
economies 
($1,025 
or less) 
Lower-
middle-
income 
economies 
($1,026 to 
$4,035) 
Upper-middle-
income economies 
($4,036 to 
$12,475) 
Costa Rica         1 
Ecuador         1 
Iran, Islamic Rep.          1 
Jordan         1 
Kazakhstan         1 
Latvia         1 
Lebanon         1 
Libya         1 
Lithuania         1 
Macedonia, FYR          1 
Malaysia         1 
Maldives         1 
Mexico         1 
Montenegro         1 
Panama         1 
Peru          1 
Romania         1 
Russian Federation         1 
Serbia         1 
Thailand         1 
Tunisia         1 
Turkey         1 
Turkmenistan         1 
Uruguay         1 
Venezuela, RB         1 
Grand Total 48 79 36 54 54 
Source: UNCTAD, 2012; World Bank, 2013b. 
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